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PREFACE 
Diplomatic historians have devoted an almost immeasurable amount 
of labor and innumerable volumes to the pre-World War I era. This was 
particularly true during the second quarter of this century, as the 
publication of the various governmental documents relating to that con-
flict increased the possibilities for research in the area. In fact, so 
much has been done that in the past two or three decades most history 
students have avoided the subject under the assumption that no signifi-
cant work remained. This thesis attempts to bring a new perspective to 
this much-studied period, and to the Diplomatic Revolution of the 
Twentieth Century in particular. 
An examination of the historiography of the realignment of the 
powers between 1902 .... 1907 reveals that almost all historians treat the 
topic as one of a purely European character, in which East Asia was 
simply one of several areas of interest to Europe rather than an active 
protagonist itself. I believe, and it is the contention of this work, 
that this approach does not adequately account for the series of events 
which, beginning in 1902 and culminating in 1907, so radically.altered 
the diplomatic relationships of the great European powers. Sufficient 
attention has not been given to the role of Japan, a newly arrived mem-
ber of the world power structure, in the inception and the progress of 
this realignment of nations. It was not a purely European phenomenon. 
It had its genesis and its raison d'etre in the reorganization and the 
revitalization of the Japanese Empire during the last quarter of the 
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nineteenth century. 
The completion of any labor leads one to reflect upon the pro-
gress of that work through its various stages and upon.the debts of 
gratitude which were thereby incurred. I should be -less than deserving 
of the attentions of those who have so helped me if I failed to acknow-
ledge their assistance. 
I must first mention my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Harris of 
Stratford, Oklahoma, for the years of sacrifice and unfailing encourage-
ment which they have given, and without which my educational progress 
would have been terminated long ago .. I remember with ever increasing 
appreciation those professors in the Department of History at East 
Central State College who so freely gave of their time to me as an 
undergraduate, and who encouraged me to continue my education at the 
graduate level. I must, of course, thank Dr. Homer L. Knight for his 
kindness in extending the graduate assistantship to.me which made 
possible my period of study at Oklahoma State University. 
Research of this type would be made almost.impossible without 
the assistance of a competent and willing library staff such.as .the one 
at the Oklahoma State University Library, Much of this work was done 
off campus, and it would not have been possible without the special 
assistance and kindnesses of Mrs. Josephine Monk, Assistant~in-Charge 
of the Fourth Floor Circulation Desk, and Mrs. Heather Lloyd, Reference 
Librarian. 
The assistance of Professor Douglas D. Hale, my thesis adviser, 
has been invaluable. Dr. Hale's patient and incisive criticism of this 
work, his contributions of his time in consultation, and his encourage-
ment are most gratefully acknowledged. Professor Sidney D. Brown also 
iv 
gave of his time to read the work and offered many valuable criticisms. 
I thank them both especially for the promptness,and the care with which ,,~ 
they examined the work. I must, however, assume all responsibility for 
any errors in fact or interpretation which may remain. 
If anything may be labeled as a labor of love, it must surely be 
the task which falls to the wife who must also serve as typist, editor, 
errand girl, research assistant, and Encourager-in-Chief. My staff of 
workers, Clyta Lynn Harris, proved more than adequate to the situation. 
She is to be congratulated for her tolerance and patience. I am most 
grateful to her. 
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Under the cover of the predawn darkness of February 8, 1904, 
three torpedo boat flotillas from the Imperial Japanese Navy had stolen 
silently into the outer reaches of Port Arthur, Korea, where the Rus-
sian Far Eastern Fleet lay at anchor. Without warning, the Japanese 
had opened fire and thereby submitted their longstanding quarrel with 
the Russians to that great and final arbiter--Mars. The following 
morning the remainder of the Japanese fleet approached the harbor, 
intent upon the completion of the work so earnestly begun the night 
before. But Admiral Togo, the Japanese commander, had missed his oppor-
tunity. He had no success in drawing the Russians out for a fight on 
the high seas where the advantage of the shore batteries would be denied 
them and the superior speed and armament of the Japanese ships could be 
fully exploited. Togo therefore broke off the engagement and repaired 
to open waters rather than risk losses in a point-blank gun battle with-
in the confines of the harbor. Though the Japanese had not succeeded 
in destroying the Russian fleet, they had rendered the Russians incap-
able of offering a significant challenge to the supremacy of the Japan-
ese navy in the Yellow Sea for many critical months.I 
lFor details of the opening battle of the war, see Edwin Falk, 
Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power (New York, 1936), pp. 296-299; 
R. C. V. Bodley, Admiral Togo (London, 1935), pp. 155-157; and Georges 
Blond, Admiral Togo (New York, 1960), pp. 155-164. 
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Thus the Japanese opened the first major conflict of the twen-
tieth century with a bold and daring attack which drew the world's 
attention to East Asia and to developments which had not seemed of par-
ticular importance before. How could the small island empire of Japan 
bring itself to attack such a behemoth as the Russian Empire? How 
could they possibly entertain any hopes of success? These were the 
questions Europeans asked themselves. Were the Japanese not aware of 
the Franco-Russian Alliance and the vast system of international com-
mitments and obligations of which it was a part? With the last ques-
tion, Europeans awoke to the manifold implications of the Russo-Japanese 
War. If anyone had forgotten, the fact was now recalled: the Japanese 
had made an alliance with Great Britain in 1902. 2 Should another 
European power enter the contest against Japan, this alliance would 
find its casus foederis. The rise of Japan to world power status and 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, therefore, forced European dip-
lomats to make a serious reevaluation of their policies and positions. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance freed Japan to attack Russia without 
great concern for French intervention. 3 The actual outbreak of hostil-
ities, in fact, forced France to undertake a serious attempt to recon-
cile her differences with Britain as insurance against becoming involved 
in a war in which she and Britain were allied to opposing sides. The 
resultant entente between Britain and France persuaded the Germans 
21. H. Nish concludes that at this time ''it was not widely re-
cognized, either in informed or in less informed circles that Britain 
was making a major departure in foreign policy." Nish, The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 
(London, 1966), p. 244. 
3w. L. Langer gives great emphasis to the role which the British 
played in the Japanese decision for war. See his The Diplomacy of.Im-
perialism, 1890-1902 (2 vols., New York, 1935), Vol. II, p. 720. 
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to seek and conclude the abortive Treaty of Bjorko with the Russians in 
1905. 4 These three alliances, excepting the Anglo~Russian convention of 
1907, constituted the sum of the adjustments made by the European powers 
in response to the Russo-Japanese War. The coming of the war was there-
fore of paramount importance to European diplomacy during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century and indeed to all subsequent diplomacy. 
It resulted in a major realignment of international relationships, 
contributed significantly to the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust 
between European nations, and, by revealing the weakness of Russia 
and emphasizing the isolation of Germany, made almost certain the 
intrigue and unrest which culminated in the First World War a decade 
later. 
The years from 1902 to 1905 offer very fertile fields for the 
diplomatic historian to cultivate. Many writers have examined the 
events of this period, but most have considered it primarily from the 
European viewpoint. They have concentrated upon trends within Europe 
itself and treated East Asia as a matter of secondary importance--rank-
ing with, but not above, Africa and Central Asia. What is proposed here 
is the antithesis of this approach. This paper will examine the course 
of European diplomacy from 1902 to 1905 and attempt to demonstrate the 
centrality of East Asia as a factor in determining its direction. The 
touchstone of the entire matter was, of course, Russo-Japanese competi-
tion for hegemony which led to war in 1904. 
The Russians suffered serious reverses from the very beginning 
of the war. The Japanese moved quickly and with a well-calculated 
4John Albert White termed the entente "the most 
tinuing series of blows to Germany's security system." 
macy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton, New Jersey, 
recent of a con-
Whit~The Diplo-
1964), p. 175. 
4 
precision which contrasted starkly with the confusion and vacillation of 
the Russian forces. The Japanese army soon demonstrated its proficiency 
in combat. The battle of the Yalu was opened in April, 1904, and to 
their chagrin and amazement, the Russians were obliged to give way be-
fore the tenacious little "Japs." This successful venture was followed 
by landings in the area of Kwantung. The Japanese then surrounded Port 
Arthur, and in August they launched the first in a series of vicious and 
determined assaults upon that stronghold. Stessel, the Russian command-
er, assessed the situation, decided it hopeless, and surrendered the 
fortress with its remaining 28,000 troops on New Year's Day, 1905.s 
The Russians found circumstances just as disheartening in other 
areas. A most tragic episode ensued when the Tsar's Baltic fleet, under 
the command of Rear Admiral Rozdestvensky, began its ill-fated journey 
in October, 1904, to reinforce the fleet at Vladivostok. In the dark-
nessoff Dogger Bank, Rozdestvensky blundered into the midst of a British 
fishing fleet. Earlier rumors of Japanese torpedo boats in the North 
Sea, the darkness, and the frayed nerves of the Russian gunners quickly 
transformed the harmless trawlers into deadly attack craft. The war-
ships opened fire, and in the confusion, Russian was soon firing upon 
Russian as well as the English fishermen.6 The incident lasted only a 
few minutes, but those few minutes wrought considerable destruction upon 
Spar a condensed chronology of the war on the Chinese mainland, 
see Richard Starry,~ History of Modern Japan (Baltimore, 1960), 
pp. 139-142. 
6The letters of a Russian engineer on board the Suvaroff give an 
interesting insight into the thoughts and fears which led to the Dogger 
Bank tragedy. See Eugene S. Politovsky, From Libau to Tsushima (trans. 
by Major F. R. Godfrey, New York, 1906), pp. 9-16. 
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the British fishing vessels with the loss of two lives and several 
wounded. Rozdestvensky, unaware of his error, sailed on without making 
any attempt to render aid or to report the matter. 
Though shocked, the fishermen were not struck dumb. A delegation 
was sent to Parliament, and when the story was made public, the rage of 
the British people could hardly be contained. As a bit of contemporary 
doggerel had it, 
And after all this an Admiral came; 
A terrible man with a terrible name, 
A name which we all of us know very well, 
But no one can speak and no one can spell. 7 
The reaction of the British government was immediate. The Russian fleet 
found itself blockaded in Vigo harbor by the combined Channel, Mediter-
ranean, and Reserve fleets of Britain, and it appeared doubtful that the 
Russians would be allowed to leave without combat. St. Petersburg was 
quick to realize that war with Great Britain was not only possible but 
extremely likely unless resolute action was initiated immediately. 
Fortunately, the characteristic lethargy of Russian diplomacy was shaken 
off. Apologies accompanied by protestations of willingness to make 
restitution were sufficient to prevent the Britons from striking back in 
anger. Nevertheless, both Russian nerves and prestige were badly shaken 
by the incident. 
The Russians should have taken Stessel's surrender of Port Arthur 
as an evil omen, for such it proved to be. The Japanese opened an 
important action against the Russian forces at Mukden in March, 1905, 
and soon forced the Tsar's troops to retire from that strategic outpost. 
Russia had suffered a prolonged series of reverses during the first 
7Quoted in White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, 
pp. 139-142. 
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year of the war; her forces had been able to do nothing more than offer 
repeated resistance before once again retiring and leaving the Japanese 
in command of the field. But the Japanese army, though it consistently 
pushed the Russians back, was unable to trap them.and deliver a death-
blow. Japan's greatest feat of arms remained to be accomplished by the 
Imperial Navy. 
If Admiral Rozdestvensky and the Russian Baltic Fleet had begun 
their twenty thousand-mile voyage in blunder; they were destined to end 
it in total tragedy. The admiral had accomplished nothing short of a 
minor miracle by bringing the fleet into Asian waters without having had 
to abandon a single ship. By mid-May, 1905, he was ready to undertake 
the last leg of the long journey. It only remained for him to sail from 
the coast of Indo-China to Vladivostok. Before reaching the safety of 
Vladivostok, however, he had to pass between the tip of the Korean 
peninsula and the Japanese _home islands--through thenarrowStraits of 
Tsushima. The alternative involved making a wide sweep around the 
eastern side of Japan without adequate coaling facilities and under the 
constant danger of torpedo boat attacks. The fleet which carried the 
Tsar's last hopes of victory therefore made its way into the Straits of 
Tsushima in the early morning hours of May 27, 1905. Shortly after 
noon, they were intercepted by the Imperial Japanese Fleet under the 
command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro. 8 
Togo's flagship, the Mikasa, led the Japanese column southward 
on a course slightly to the east of the northward-bound Russian fleet. 
When the two columns had converged to a range of a few thousand yards 
81t is of ironic interest to note the meaning of this name: "the 
peaceful son" (Heihachiro) "of the eastern hamlet'' (Togo). 
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Togo ordered the Mikasa turned onto a course which would place her on a 
course perpendicular to that of the lead battleship in the Russian line. 
It was no small gamble. For several minutes the ship would be almost 
stationary in the water as the maneuver was completed, and consequently, 
dangerously vulnerable to the guns of the enemy ships. As each Japanese 
ship reached the Mikasa's turning point, it duplicated the maneuver and 
followed her lead until finally the Japanese battle line was perpendi-
cular to that of the Russians. The "T" was crossed. The result was an 
overwhelming advantage in firepower for Togo's ships. The entire Japan-
ese fleet was firing broadside, while only the lead ships in the Russian 
column were able to fire effectively, and then only with their forward 
turrets. The balance of the Russian fleet were masked by the head of 
their column and were unable to bring their guns to bear on the Japanese? 
As Admiral Togo sailed "across the T" that day, he also sailed 
into the pages of naval history, Only two Russian ships managed to 
escape to Vladivostok. This crushing blow brought the realization to 
the Russian government that a negotiated peace with Japan was the only 
realistic solution to their dilemma. 10 The Japanese were also willing 
to conclude peace, as their financial condition was growing more 
strained daily. Thus, through the good offices,of President Theodore 
Roosevelt, the Portsmouth Peace Conference was convened, and a treaty 
was concluded on September 5, 1905. 11 
9Richard Hough, The Fleet that Had to Die (New York, 1958), 
p. 13. 
lOwhite, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 209. 
llJohn K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, A 




How appropriate it would have been, if, as their American hosts 
had done 124 years before at Yorktown, the Japanese could have had a 
band present to play an appropriate tune--"The World Turned Upside 
Down." Prior to 1905 the course of world events had been determined 
almost wholly by the will of the great European powers. From the time 
of the Renaissance, no Asian nation had figured prominently in the 
political or military affairs of the world. Indeed, by the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century it appeared that the civilizations of 
both China and Japan would collapse before the onslaught of western 
technology. The Opium Wars, the negotiation-of tn.e ~tunequal treaties,11 
and the subsequent occupation of territorial enclaves along the coast 
of China seemed to establish a precedent which the Europeans could be 
expected to follow at the earliest opportunity in regard to Japan. The 
Japanese, however, had worked feverishly throughout the last third of 
the century in a desperate attempt to escape the fate which had befallen 
the Chinese. Copying the useful, discarding the superfluous, adapting 
and innovating, the Japanese were running a race for their national 
life, and they knew it. 12 
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 should have demonstrated to tne 
European powers that the Japanese would not be so easily handled as the 
Chinese had been. It certainly led the Japanese to a very important 
1211Like their Chinese counterparts, Japan's leaders in the 1860's 
and subsequent decades clearly recognized the military superiority of 
the Western nations. Military. strengthening was one of the objectives 
enunciated by the Meiji government as soon as it was organized ... 
the Japanese were almost desperately interested in finding out what lay 
behind the West's superior powers ... -" 
"In fact, from the time of the Iwakura mission, economic develop-
ment and the development of popular .political consciousness became the 
key objectives of Meiji Japan." Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An 
Inner History.of American-East Asian Relations (New York, 1967), 
pp. 45-46. 
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conclusion. The postwar Three-Power intervention deprived the Japanese 
of much of what they had fought for and also convinced them that sooner 
or later they would have to fight the Russians. This was prescience 
indeed, for the conflict did come just one decade later. That it came 
surprised almost no one; that Japan was victorious surprised many. Even 
the confident Japanese must have been mildly surprised by the totality 
of their triumph over western arms. 13 
The Russian defeat was the capstone in the new and radically 
changed world power structure. The European powers had been engaged in 
almost frantic diplomatic maneuvering and intrigue since the 1870's, 
which had been complicated by the emergence of nationalistic antagonism 
to an unprecedented degree. Under these circumstances, the necessities 
of security made for some strange bedfellows. Republican France was 
allied with Tsarist Russia to thwart German expansion at the expense of 
either France or Russia. Imperial Britain, increasingly concerned for 
the security of her possessions, ·pondered the possibilities of an 
alliance with Germany as insurance in the case of future confrontations 
with France and her ally, Russia.14 
The gradual recognition of Japan as a competing world power, 
however, initiated a series of dramatic changes in this diplomatic 
13Most characteristic of this attitude, perhaps, is Blond's 
account of the sinking of the Oslabia at Tsushima. "Clusters of white-
clad Russian sailors could be seen clinging, like a strange swarm of 
insects, to the steeply sloping deck; then as the slope became sheer, 
sliding down into the sea. The Japanese sailors watched the tragic 
spectacle intently; this was something they had never seen~~a mighty 
warship, sunk by their gunfire, going to the bottom." Blond, Admiral 
Togo, p. 227. 
14Goldsworthy Dickinson has provided excellent summary of the 
general international situation from 1870 to 1914. See his The Inter-
national Anarchy, 1904-1914 (New York, 1926), pp. 29-72. 
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labyrinth. Within the three years from 1902 to 1905 the world witnessed 
the formation of three alignments which would have raised incredulous 
eyebrows had they been suggested as late as 1898: The-Anglo~apanese 
Alliance of 1902, the Entente Cordiale of 1904, and .. th.e .aoortive Treaty 
of Bjorko in 1905. Separately, the three .alliances were surprising 
enough, considering the differences between the erstwhile allies, but 
they did have one circumstance in common: each had some.connection. 
with the increased power and prestige of Japan. Taken together, these 
events constituted nothing less than a modern European diplomatic 
revolution--a revolution whose genesis can be traced to two islands, 
half a world apart. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the island kingdom of Great 
Britain possessed one of the largest empires the world had ever seen. 
Her dominions ranged from the arctic wastes of northern Canada to the 
tropical topography of southern Africa, and from Vancouver in the West 
to Hong Kong in the East. It was an empire which .other nations envied, 
but during the greater part of the nineteenth century they had been 
unable to offer serious competition. This was a circumstance fromwhich 
the British took great comfort, for as an industrial nation, they 
depended heavily upon the favorable balance of trade which the empire 
afforded them. The British had never taken this position of predomin-
ance for granted; they knew full well that it depended very much upon 
their unchallenged mastery of the seas. This hegemony was seriously 
challenged during the last decade of the century, however, by the 
Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. 1 
The Franco-Russian Alliance linked two of Britain's keenest 
competitors and significantly strengthened both in the race for world 
empire. 2 Russia had been enough of a threat to British India throughout 
1Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (4 vols., London, 
1901-03), Vol. IV, p~ 135. 
2George Monger.termed the Franco-Russian Alliance "an extremely 
efficient combination." Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign 
Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 1963), p. 7. 
1 1 
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the latter years of the nineteenth century, but after 1900, when the 
Russians appeared to be within a few years of completing railways which 
would link European Russia with her territories bordering on the Indo-
Persian frontiers, the menace was compounded. 3 Only slightly less 
alarming to the British was the prospect of continued Russian expansion 
in East Asia, something the projected completion of the Trans-Siberian 
railway would undoubtedly bring. 4 This Russian challenge wa.5serious 
enough by itself, but the British found that other nations also wished 
to increase their wealth and prestige. 
The French were competing with the British for the preponderant 
position in Africa. · There, during the late .. 1890 .1.s ,. they had established 
control over an area of North Africa which rested upon an east-west 
axis, while the British forged ahead with the establishment of a Cape-
to-Cairo claim on a north-south axis. Obviously the two.had to confront 
each other sooner or later in a situation from which.only.one.could 
emerge satisfactorily. This happened at Fashoda in 1898. 5 Anglo..,.French 
competition was not limited to Africa, however. The British were made 
increasingly aware of the French presence in Indo-China as the latter 
attempted to push their sphere of influence further north and ever 
closer to British interests in the Yangtze region~ 6 
Such vigorous competition for colonial possessions emphasized a 
very important fact for the British government, and this fact, perhaps 
3J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, The End 
of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1964), p. 293. 
4Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. II, p. 679. 
5Ibid., p. 538. 
6The British were especially concerned about the Yangtse Valley 
area. Amery, Chamberlain, pp. 137-138. 
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more than anything else, alarmed them. The Franco-Russian combination 
made the maintenance of the two-power fleet virtually impossible.and 
thereby shattered an important cornerstone of imperial policy. It was 
becoming a financial impossibility for the British to maintain what they 
considered to be the essential margin of safety. Between 1896 and 1902, 
overall national expenditure had risen at a rate ten times greater than 
it had for the corresponding period from 1883 to 1889. 7 Furthermore, as 
a result of the unfriendly and rather menacing attitude which the Euro-
pean powers had demonstrated during the Boer War, no end seemed in sight. 
The coup de grace came with the German Naval Bills of 1898 and 1900. If 
the goals of this construction program were realized, Bri taints relation .... 
ship with the continental powers would be radically and detrimentally 
8 
altered. Britain's situation was not unique,. however; in many ways it 
was very similar to that of another island empire halfway around the 
world. 
The efforts of the Japanese to modernize and to meet successfully 
the threat posed by the European powers to East Asia had begun to bear 
fruit by the 1890's. Japan's successful prosecution of the Sino-
Japanese War was tangible proof that she had made very significant pro-
gress toward becoming a world power. The rather easy conquests which 
were made during the war also provided a stimulus to the growth of im-
perialistic notions among the Japanese. However, any immediate hopes 
which Japan might have had of establishing herself as a colonial power 
on the Chinese mainland were quickly erased by the intervention of 
Russia, Germany, and France in the treaty negotiations between Japan 
7Monger, End of Isolation, p. 8. 
8Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 654-656. 
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and China. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which had represented.national 
power and prestige in May, 1895, had oecome symoolic of weakness and 
9 
disgrace by November. 
The Japanese realized that. th.er could not match. .tfi.e comoined 
military forces of the three powers, nor could tfi.ey.liope to afford.a 
construction program which would place them on an equitable footing. 
They surmised, however~ that if Japan were to be given .. th.e chance to 
realize its fullest potential quickly, its industrieswould have to.be 
afforded the magnitude of opportunity which only colonial markets could 
offer. r_"t is, therefore, very easy to understand the indignation and 
frustration which gripped the Japanese in the years between 1895 and 
1900 as they watched the European powers, Russia in particular,.pene~ 
trate the same territories which they had so recently denied to Japan .. 
The Japanese did not sit and idly bemoan their fate, however. With the 
same determination that had marked their amazing progress from 1868 to 
1894, they redoubled their efforts to strengthen their military, and 
particular emphasis was laid upon the construction .of .. a strong, modern 
naval force. 10 Even though. Japan did significantly improve her situa ... 
tion after 1895, she was still no match for the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
9Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 26-30. 
10sir Ernest Satow, in a report to Lord Salisbury dated March 26, 
1898, assessed the situation thusly: "Since the.intervention of the 
three Powers in 1895, which resulted in the retrocession .of the.Liaotung 
Peninsula, Japan seems to have taken up an attitude of present resigna-
tion to the inevitable, accompanied by strenuous efforts to place her 
military and naval establishments on such a footing as to enable her in 
the future to resist any attempt at intervention of the same kind. It 
was Russia that Japan feared most of the three Powers .... " Satow to 
Salisbury, March 26, 1898, G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, eds., 
British Documents£!!. the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (11 vols., 
London, 1927), Vol. I, no. 40, pp. 25-27. (Hereafter cited as BD). 
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To counter this combination, and to insure against the possibility of an 
unfriendly Germany, the Japanese-~like.the British-~needed an ally. 
If Anglo-Japanese relations before 1894 cannot be characterized 
as friendly, neither can they be classified as unfriendly. The British 
attitude toward the Japanese probably can be described best as one of 
benevolent disinterest. They were certainly aware of the Japanese, as 
an examination of their commercial.relations will indicate, but they 
were more concerned with the protection of the British sphere of influ~ 
ence within China. It was with Britain, however, that Japan concluded 
an important milepost in the history of her relations with the western 
powers, the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894. Through this 
treaty, Britain voluntarily renounced extraterritorial rights in Japan. 
This event was pregnant with significance for future relations. By 
surrendering what was a constant reminder of national humiliation to 
the Japanese, the British avoided niuch animosity and set a precedent for 
the other powers to follow .. With the recovery of these rights, Japan 
reassumed the trappings of national sovereignty and thereby qualified 
as a peer in the community of .nations.11 
The year 1900 marked a turning point in the history of both Brit-
ain and Japan. Britain had become involved in the Boer War and was 
quite unprepared for the strain which this undertaking placed upon her 
resources. Furthermore, at a time when she was totally occupied with 
the South African republics, Russia began probing sensitive areas of 
the British empire in Central Asia. The.Russians also promoted talk of 
_ 11For an exce11ent account of Anglo-Japanese relations during 
the 1890's see Charles Nelson Spinks, "The Background of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance," Pacific Historical Review 1 Vol. VIII (September 1 
1939), pp. 317-322. 
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concerted intervention by the continental powers on the behalf of the 
Boer republics, and this, in particular, made it painfully clear to the 
British that they stood alone. 
To further complicate the situation, the Boxer Rebellion broke 
out in the summer of 1900, and the attention of the West was once again 
focused upon China. 12 The Boer conflict prevented the British from 
giving much active assistance to the restoration of order in China, but 
the Japanese had no such handicap. As a result of their speedy and 
efficient performance in China, the Japanese troops who participated in 
the Boxer campaign won the respect of their western comrades, and the 
Japanese government caught the eyes of the British government. 13 Japan 
played a large role in pulling Britain~s chestnuts out of the fire in 
Asia, and this did not go unnoticed. 14 The British attitude toward 
Japan had been changing, and perhaps no better indication was needed 
than the loan which Japan had negotiated in 1899. That the British 
would lend £10,000,000 at four percent interest indicated a high degree 
of confidence in Japan, and this conclusion was strengthened by the fact 
that the loan carried no political strings. 15 Both nations were gradu-
ally recognizing the complimentary relationship of their respective 
1211 •• China brought the cr1s1s in British foreign policy to a 
head." Amery, Chamberlain, p. 159. 
13"The Boxer crisis gave a new dimension to the relations between 
Britain and Japan: it was the British and Japanese forces which 
tended to act together." Nish, Anglo-Japanese Al Hance, p. 91. 
14Aoki, the Japanese Foreign Minister, took the opportunity to 
send a private and confidential message to London. Presented to the 
Cabinet, it urged the "imperative necessity for understanding between 
Great Britain, Germany and Japan to counteract Russian designs." 
Grenville, Salisbury, pp. 311-312. 
lSNish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 77. 
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interests in East Asia. Further.more, changes were occurring in their 
governments, especially from the fall of 1900 to the spring of 1901, and 
these changes would make formal recognition of the common interests much 
easier. 
The British experienced their first significant change in Octo-
ber, 1900. Lord Salisbury, premier and foreign secretary, was forced to 
surrender the foreign office as a result of his failing health and the 
increasing dissatisfaction of many party members with his conduct of 
affairs. The government had taken advantage of several successes in the 
South African war to call an election for September, and the appointment 
of a new foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne, was made during the cabinet 
shuffle which followed this "khaki election." Lansdowne was to be 
assisted at the foreign office by Lord Cranborne, and Lord Selbourne 
replaced Goschen at the Admiralty. 16 
Lansdowne was an able administrator and brought with him consid~ 
erable experience as a former governor-general of Canada and viceroy of 
India. Furthermore, he had served as war minister in Salisbury's last 
cabinet. Such experience, as might be expected, gave him an awareness 
of the needs and issues which faced.the empire. Perhaps as important 
as all else, however, Lansdowne was always ready for suggestions, and 
he was careful to keep the lines of communication with his overseas 
advisers open. 17 
This change was also important because Salisbury had been fre-
quently absent on increasingly long recuperative holidays, and in his 
16Grenville, Salisbury, pp. 321-325. 
17Lansdowne's experience in Government is well covered by 
Chapters 2-5 in Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: ~ Biography (London, 
1929), pp. 24-194. 
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absence his duties as foreign secretary were assumed by his nephew, 
James Arthur Balfour. Since Balfour was not particularly fond of the 
prospect of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, the appointment of Lansdowne as 
foreign secretary cleared two stumbling blocks from the path of such an 
t 1. t d . t t B . . h f . 1 · 18 even ua i y an gave new 1mpe us o r1t1s ore1gn po icy. 
As if to give a further and more obvious indication of the 
changes which were occurring, the aged and meddlesome Victoria died in 
January, 1901, and the crown passed to her personable and politically 
conscious son, Edward VII. The role of the monarch in the conduct of 
foreign policy at this time can be overemphasized, but it should be 
noted that Edward VII took an interest in Britain~s image and was anx~ 
ious to see evidence of increased pro-British sentiment among her neigh-
bors. The active assistance of the throne proved to be no small factor 
· f f th · 11· 1 t "th. Great Bri"tai·n. 19 1n avor o e emerging pro-a 1ance e emen w1 in 
The government· of Japan was also undergoing changes. The period 
between 1898 and 1901 marked the most intense phase of the struggle 
between the aging oligarchs, Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi, the 
chief advocates, respectively, of the concepts of transcendental govern-
ment and party government for Japan. The contest between these two ele-
ments emphasized the introspective nature of Japanese politics at that 
time. A positive, well-planned approach to foreign affairs was made 
practically impossible by the transient nature of the Japanese cabinets 
18Grenville, Salisbury, p. 326. 
l9Edward's position on the alliance project is perhaps best 
illustrated by a minute which he placed on one of the foreign office 
dispatches in August, 1901: "The King considers it most essential that 
we should give Japan our hearty support on all occasions when it is 
possible to do so. E. R." Lansdowne to Whitehead, August 14, 1901, 
BD, Vol. I, no. 103, pp. 91-92. 
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of the day. Both Yamagata and Ito, however, had retired to positions 
which gave them less direct control over the everyday conduct of the 
government by the summer of 1901. Yamagata resigned the premiership in 
October, 1900, and Ito, who had succeeded him, also resigned the posi-
tion in May, 1901. Though their influence continued to be felt, it had 
changed from a primary nature--policy formulation--to a secondary 
t 1 . 1 d . . . 20 na ure--po icy approva, amen at1on, or reJect1on. 
Another change which proved to be of significance to the course 
of Anglo-Japanese relations was the appointment of Baron Hayashi Tadasu 
to be the Japanese minister to Great Britain. Hayashi has been de-
scribed as "an Englishman in mind and almost in appearance. 1121 This 
refined gentleman of considerable diplomatic ability had served as the 
Japanese minister to China (1895-97) and to Russia (1897-99), and this 
service abroad had convinced him that Japan's days of isolation were 
over. He had, in fact, stated that he hoped to be able to conclude an 
alliance during his stay in Britain even before he had departed Japan to 
take up his duties at London in the spring of 1900. 22 Hayashi, however, 
was running ahead of his government. As a result of the shifts which 
occurred in October, 1900, and May, 1901, he made no significant pro-
gress in impressing his views upon the Japanese foreign office. Even 
after Viscount Katsura Taro had formed a government to succeed the Ito 
ministry in June, 1901, it was still another three months before the 
2°For an excellent and brief discussion of the period see Fair-
bank, Reischauer, and Craig,~ History of East Asian Civilization, 
Vol. !Ii pp. 305-307. 
21 
Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 128. 
22Hayashi had made this statement to G. E. Morrison, a corre-
spondent for The Times. Ibid. 
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interim foreign minister was replaced by the Katsura appointee, Komura 
Jutaro. Only then did the Japanese minister to Great Britain find him-
23 
self in step with his home government. 
Thus the changes which occurred in both governments between the 
fall of 1900 and the summer of 1901 were of primary importance to the 
progress of Britain and Japan toward the opening of negotiations for an 
alliance. In each case a group of somewhat younger and generally less 
conservative men assumed a major share of responsibility for the formu-
lation of foreign policy. These diplomats were almost without exception 
either favorably disposed toward or actively promoting an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. They were no longer merely prophets crying out in the wilder-
ness, unheeded by their less prescient contemporaries. The unfavorable 
diplomatic circumstances of the two nations made the moment propitious 
for formal agreements which would offer increased security for both. 
The British, who had had much to offer to a prospective ally for many 
years, now very distinctly felt the need for one, 24 and the Japanese, 
who had needed one for several years, now had something to offer an ally 
in return. 
The event which provided the occasion for serious Anglo-Japanese 
negotiations occurred in January, 1901. On January 3, The Times printed 
what was proported to be an accord between Russia and China, the 
Alexeiev-Tseng Agreement, which would have mad~ Manchuria virtually a 
Russian protectorate.25 The Japanese, already disturbed by the continued 
23It was Komura who finally telegraphed Hayashi authorization to 
begin official discussions. Ibid., p. 173. 
24Monger, End of Isolation, p. 21. 
25Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 112. 
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Russian presence in the northern Chinese province, were determined to 
prevent any such development. When the Japanese asked him directly if 
there were any truth in the rumors, Lamsdorff, the Russian foreign 
minister, refused to give any specific information. The Japanese there..-
upon launched a campaign to muster international support. Britain was 
approached first.26 
Hayashi talked to Lansdowne on January 12, 1901, and suggested 
that Britain should join Japan in lodging a protest with the Russians. 
This Lansdowne declined to do, but he did agree to "advise" the Chinese 
court against making any such commitments to a single power. The Ger-
mans gave similar advice through a separate declaration. Though the 
Russians gave assurances that they had no intention of seeking to retain 
territory in Manchuria, the terms of evacuation which they presented 
China on February 16, made these assurances appear worthless. 27 The 
draft of this agreement provided for such sweeping concessions to Russia 
that on March 1, the Chinese appealed to the powers for assistance in 
obtaining revision. The Japanese were prepared to take determined meas-
ures to prevent the Russians from obtaining such a preponderant position 
in north China as the draft agreement would have given them. They again 
approached the British, this time suggesting that Japan and Britain 
should promise the Chinese "material support" if the Russians should 
continue to press for acceptance of the draft agreement.28 This, of 
2611The Tsardom's expansion into Manchuria was.still unchecked; 
and it became the first task of Britishstatesmanship to find an alter-
native barrier against it. In the nature of things this could now only 
be Japan." Amery, Chamberlain, p. 164. 
27Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 113. 
28Ibid. 
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course, meant simply that the British and Japanese navies would come to 
China's aid if the Russians attacked. Such a proposal was more than 
Lansdowne could accept at the moment, for several reasons. Britain had 
over 300,000 men committed to South Africa, and she could not risk dis-
aster there by overextending herself in Asia.29 Furthermore, Lansdowne 
was not yet satisfied that the Anglo-German Agreement, to which Japan 
was also a signatory, was worthless, and he was still unwilling to dis-
miss the possibility of an extended alliance with Germany to counter-
balance Russian expansionism in East Asia.30 It should also be remem-
bered that observers at this time were not convinced that Japan could 
cope with Russia on the battlefield, even in a one-to-one situation. 
Lansdowne, therefore, found himself in no small dilemma. He 
feared that the Japanese would attack the Russians with the slightest 
encouragement; yet he also feared that should they do so, Britain might 
become involved. Just as unpalatable to the foreign secretary, however, 
was the thought that in the face of repeated British refusals to assist 
them in curbing Russian encroachments, the Japanese might despair of 
handling the situation and decide to come to terms with the Russians.31 
Either development was undesirable from the British point of view, but 
of the two, the latter was probably the more distasteful. A Russo-
29Monger, End of Isolation, p. 12. 
30Grenville says this conclusion had been drawn by Salisbury 
even before he retired as Foreign Secretary, but Lansdowne was not at 
first inclined to agree. Grenville, Salisbury, p. 318. It must also 
be remembered that Lansdowne was in very close communication with 
Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, and through Lansdowne, 
Chamberlain apparently still hoped to forge the Anglo-German Alliance 
which he had so long desired. 
3111 If she [Japan] could not obtain an alliance with Britain, 
then, at whatever cost, she must come to terms with the Tsardom." 
Amery, Chamberlain, p. 165. 
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Japanese war might be a temporary threat to British security, but a 
Russo-Japanese entente would be a permanent menace. 
It appears that Lansdowne was not sure of the German response 
to a Russo-Japanese conflict, and Germany's attitude in such a circum-
stance would be crucial. The British were strongly suspicious that in 
a pinch Germany would not support them at the risk of antagonizing the 
Russians. The Russo-German frontier was too long, and Russia's ally in 
the West was too anxious to gain revenge for the humiliation of 1871. 
Under these circumstances, Lansdowne felt compelled to decline Japan's 
offer of a joint guarantee and to await further developments. When 
·feelers to the Germans confirmed that they would not venture further 
than strict neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, Britain's 
neutrality in the immediate crisis was assured. 32 
Thus, Japan was left to face the Russians alone. Such an even-
tuality appears to have been somewhat unexpected by the Japanese, as 
they had conceived of their adherence to the Anglo-German agreement to 
be more in the nature of an alliance with definite commitments to defend 
the territorial integrity of China. 33 After the Anglo-German refusal 
to offer pos.itive resistance, it is very doubtful that the Japanese 
would have pushed the matter to the point of war by themselves in 1901, 
but they made an impressive display of bravado in the face of the 
32Biilow gave formal assurances .to the Reichstag on March 15, 
1901: "The Anglo-German agreement has no bearing on Manchuria .... 
What may become of Manchuria? Why, gentlemen, I cannot really conceive 
what could be more indifferent to us.'' Ibid., p. 152. Lansdowne, in 
his attempt to determine German intentions, even went so far as to draft 
what amounted to an Anglo-German Alliance, though it was never communi-
cated to the German government. For details of the draft see Grenville, 
Salisbury, pp. 340-342. 
33Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 107-108. 
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Russian demands. By April 1, Japan appeared to be ready to fight over 
the draft agreement, but such an extreme step proved unnecessary. On 
April 5, 1901, Russia withdrew the demands of February 16. 34 
These events were very important to the development of Anglo-
Japanese negotiations. Lansdowne now realized that Germany could not 
oe depended upon to resist Russian advances in East Asia. His reluctance 
to discard Germany as a prospective ally can be partially explained by 
an investigation of the activities of the notorious Baron Hermann von 
Eckardstein, embassy secretary in London. Eckardstein habitually over-
stated or simply fabricated opinions which he presented as being those 
of the German Foreign Office. His intrigues are now legendary, and they 
need not be treated in detail here. Eckardstein's duplicity was not so 
obvious to contemporaries--master of the innuendo that he was---andtb.ough 
Lansdowne many times was suspicious, he could not risk discounting him 
entirely. The possibility existed, however remotely, that he did repre-
sent the opinion of the German Court, even if he did overstate the posi-
tion of the foreign office. The reluctance of the German government to 
reject formally the Russian demands of February 16, however, did much to 
discredit Eckardstein, and Lansdowne ·.obviously was not going to be mis-
led further. 35 As the danger of an immediate conflict between Japan and 
Russia receded, Lansdowne became less concerned with affecting a more 
definite agreement with Germany. Baron Hayashi now had time on his side. 
The British moved toward the Japanese with increasing momentum 
during the summer of 1901. Much of the credit for this shift must be 
given to the work of Francis Bertie and Lord Selbourne. These two 
34Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
35Grenville, Salisbury, p. 343. 
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members of the government formulated the case for an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in separate but equally important documents. Bertie's argu-
ments were important for their effect upon Lansdowne during July, and 
Selbourne's representation was equally important for the cabinet as a 
whole when it reconvened in September. 
Francis Bertie was Lansdowne's undersecretary at the Foreign 
Office, and he was among the strongest proponents of an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. His influence upon Lansdowne is best demonstrated in the 
memoranda which he wrote in July, 1901. Lansdowne' s familiarity with 
these can be assumed from the content of his subsequent conversations 
with Baron Hayashi on July 23 and 31, which were highly colored by the 
proposals which'' Bertie had formulated in his memoranda. On July 20, 
Bertie had written that Japan might feel compelled to accept French and 
Russian guarantees on the neutrality of Korea, especially if they were 
combined with a good loan on favorable terms. He feared that Han 
oriental state might act without caution if it found itself without 
funds or reliable friends." Therefore, "unless we attach Japan to us 
by something more substantial than general expressions of goodwill, we 
shall run a risk of her making some arrangement which might be injur-
ious to our interests." Great Britain must 
inform Japan that [we], knowing the vital necessity to 
her of Corea not passing under foreign control, are ready 
to undertake to give Japan naval assistance in resisting 
any foreign occupation of Corea provided that Japan will 
promise to give to us, on our demand, military and naval 
aid in resisting foreign aggression in the Yangtse re-
gion and the South of China.36 
The culmination of Bertie's thoughts can be seen in the note of 
July 22, which was entitled, very significantly, "Anglo-Japanese 
36Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 154-155. 
26 
agreement: reasons why one is de,sirable and. why Germany should not be 
included. 1137 In this document, Bertie very cogently argued that should 
Russia gain possession of Korea, it would, in conjunction with her 
hegemony in Manchuria and her hold over any Chinese government, so 
threaten British interests in China that intervention would be unavoid-
able. If Britain would be forced to act under such unfavorable circum-
stances, why not support Japanese resistance to foreign occupation of 
Korea with naval and financial means through an alliance? 
When the cabinet met again.on September 5, the matter was brought 
to its attention by Lord Selbourne, Salisbury's son-in-law and First 
Lord of the Admiralty. As a result of the threatened intervention of 
the continental powers during the Boer War, Selbourne had undertaken 
a serious reevaluation of Great Britain's naval situation, and had 
become convinced that the margin of safety which the two-power fleet 
afforded Britain had been lost. In the light of the new circumstances, 
Selbourne concluded, the navy's strength was "inadequate if applied 
to a possible war against France in alliance with Russia." He stated 
that 
The decisive battles in such a war should certainly 
be fought in European waters; but it does not follow that 
we should be free to concentrate the whole of our naval 
strength in these waters and leave the outlying parts of 
the Empire to await the final issue. 
If the British Navy were defeated in the Mediter-
ranean and the Channel the stress of our position would 
not be alleviated by any amount of superiority in the 
Chinese seas. If, on the other hand, it were [to] prove 
supreme in the Mediterranean and Channel, even severe 
disasters in the Chinese seas would matter little. 
These considerations furnish, therefore, a sound argument 
for keeping our naval strength in Chinese waters as low 
as is compatible with the safety of the Empire. 
37 Ibid. 
Great Britain and Japan together would next year be 
able to show eleven battleships against the French and 
Russian nine, as well as a preponderance of cruisers. 
Great Britain would be under no necessity of adding 
to the number of battleships on the China Station, and at 
least would be in a position to contemplate the possibi-
lity of shortly establishing a small margin of superior"" 
ity in reserve at home; .... 
Japan, on the other hand, would be delivered from the 
nightmare of seeing her rising power crushed by the combi-
nation of the French and Russian fleets. 
The form which the proposed alliance might take would 
be somewhat of this sort: 
Great Britain might engage herself to come to the 
assistance of Japan, if in a quarrel between Japan and 
Russia France came to the assistance of Russia, or vice 
versa. Japan might engage herself to come to the assist-
ance of Great Britain, if in a quarrel between Great Britain 
and France, Russia came to the assistance of France or vice 
versa. 
Such an agreement would, I believe add materially to 
the naval strength of this country over the world and 
effectively diminish the prospect of war with France or 
Russia singly or in combination.38 
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The tone of the Selbourne memorandum makes it quite clear that 
the Dual Alliance was still viewed as the major threat to British 
interests and that the counterbalance to that alliance was now con-
sidered to be Japan. This was at least the conception of the top-
level strategists at the Admiralty, and their influence should not be 
underestimated. This opinion could not have failed to reach Lansdowne, 
for his conversations with Hayashi in October reveal the essence of 
Selbourne's memorandum as clearly as the July talks demonstrated the 
influence of Bertie's memoranda. Both the strategic situation and 
the form which the future alliance would take were clearly set forth. 
Hayashi had long been anxious to be about the business of nego-
tiating for an alliance. He had hinted strongly at the idea several 
38Quoted in Zara S. Steiner, "Great Britain and the Creation of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXXI 
(March, 1959), pp. 29-31. 
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times, and during one conversation with Lansdowne in April, 1901, he 
had frankly declared that "it seemed to him highly necessary that the 
Japanese Government and that of His Majesty should endeavour to arrive 
at some permanent understanding for the protection of their interests 
in that [East Asian] part of the world. 1139 Lansdowne had parried the 
suggestion by replying that he would keep his thoughts in mind, but 
without a substantive proposal he "could scarcely be expected to express 
. . . d . . "40 an opinion in regar to its merits. This Hayashi obviously could 
not deliver, for he was acting entirely on his own. The Japanese gov-
ernment was not yet resettled after the resignation of Ito in May, and 
under such circumstances, it was unwilling to venture into official 
conversations from which it would be difficult if not impossible to 
disengage. 
During the following ninety days, however, Lansdowne became dis-
enchanted with the German project, and he too became converted to the 
idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. 41 Bertie had not labored in vain, 
and on July 31 Lansdowne held a momentous conversation with Hayashi. 
Lansdowne's own words best convey the importance of the event: 
p. 89. 
I had some conversation today with the Japanese Minis-
ter in regard to affairs in the Far East. 
Baron Hayashi told me that the Japanese had a strong 
sentimental dislike to the retention by Russia of that 
Province (Manchuria), from which they had, at one time, 
been themselves expelled. 
But Japan's real concern was for Corea. . [SJooner 
or later it would have to be decided whether the Country 
39Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 17, 1901, BO, Vol. I, no. 99, 
40 Ibid. 
41Monger describes the deterioration of Anglo-German relations 
during the summer of 1901 very well. See his End of Isolation, pp. 38-
45. - -
was to fall to Russia or not ...• They would certainly 
fight in order to prevent it, and it must be the object of 
their diplomacy to isolate Russia, with which Power, if it 
· stood alone, they were prepared to deal. 
I observed that in our view also it would be most un-
fortunate that Corea should pass.into the hands of another 
Power .•.. We could no more.than the Japanese regard 
its fate with indifference .•.. 
If the Japanese'Government desired it, he (Baron 
Hayashi) would find me ready to discuss the matter with 
him with a view to the possible establishment of an under-
standing between our two countries. 
Baron Hayashi received my suggestion attentively; such 
an understanding, he said, would, of course, have to be 
based on reciprocity of engagements, and that aspect of the 
case required careful examination; he asked my permission to 
refer to the matter again. There was, [sic] he said, many 
"unseen things" connected with it.42 
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Many "unseen things" were indeed connected with the situation. 
Lansdowne had openly broached the question of formal negotiations for 
an alliance, but Hayashi had not as yet received instructions from 
his government authorizing such discussions. Lansdowne's approach, 
therefore, must have created simultaneous feelings of excitement and 
anxiety in Hayashi. He must have been thrilled by the prospect of 
seeing something for which he had wished so long almost within his 
reach, but surely he realized also that he now had to obtain support 
from his government quickly or risk losing the confidence of the 
British foreign office. 
Hayashi immediately telegraphed Sone, the interim foreign minis-
ter, and requested instructions. On August 8, he had his reply. The 
government was quite willing to discuss the matter, but the minimum 
demands which its communique set forth were so favorable to Japan that 
Hayashi was slightly apprehensive about returning with such one-sided 
suggestions. To complicate matters, he was not authorized to present 
42Lansdowne to Whitehead, July 31, 1901, BD, Vol. I, no. 102, 
pp. 90-91. 
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these suggestions formally but only to express informally the interest 
of Japan in discussing the matter. He had not been given the power of 
1 . t" 43 p en1poten 1ary. 
On August 14 Hayashi once again met with Lansdowne, and he was 
no doubt a bit concerned as he contemplated the course which the dis-
cussion was likely to follow. Though he still lacked the official 
powers which he desired, Hayashi was determined not to let the project 
die at the very moment when it appeared his hopes might be realized. 
This supposition is strengthened when Hayashi's account of the meeting 
is compared with Lansdowne's. 
Hayashi recorded that after he had unofficially explained the 
Japanese attitude toward Korea and China, Lansdowne replied that "the 
vital objects of our agreement should be to preserve the Open Door into, 
and territorial integrity of, the Chinese Empire, as well as the inter-
ests of Japan in Korea." Furthermore, Hayashi went so far as to report 
that Lansdowne used the word "alliance" several times during the course 
of the discussion.44 
Lansdowne came away with an .entirely different impression of the 
meeting. According to his version, Hayashi had raised the question of 
an Anglo-Japanese "understanding," stating.that "his government would 
be glad to come to such an understanding." Hayashi asked Lansdowne 
"whether [he] was in a position to explain to him the conditions which 
[the British] should require." Lansdowne parried this question by 
stating that since Japan was "more immediately interested" than 
43Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 158. 
44 rbid., p. 159. 
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Britain, it was rather for her to formulate a statement of requirements. 
Britain would then consider these and.reply with lier terms, 45 
Lansdowne made no mention of the suggestion on his part of an 
alliance. Indeed, he quoted Hayashi as saying that "he !Hayashi] did 
not for a moment suppose that there could be any question of an offen-
sive or defensive alliance between us." The Japanese minister described 
Japan's policy toward China as one which supported the ''open door" and 
the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. As for Korea, Haya-
shits country "would go to war rather than see Corea fall into the hands 
of Russia, if they could be assured against the hostile intervention of 
a third Power." Lansdowne gave no indication that he responded with 
any enthusiasm to this statement, but instead suggested to Hayashi that 
he obtain "definite instructions" upon various points. As soon as he 
had obtained this, Lansdowne assured him, he would find the British 
ready to respond.46 
Of the two accounts, Lansdowne's is undoubtedly the more depend-
able. It is highly unlikely that the British foreign secretary would 
have committed himself by speaking.of an alliance before he knew of 
the official position of the Japanese government. Furthermore, it would 
appear that although Lansdowne was.ready to discuss the matter, he was 
by no means anxious about it. He had only recently begun to swing away 
from the idea of an Anglo-German agreement, and his writings do not 
reveal a sudden revulsion for Germany accompanied by a quick turn toward 
Japan. In this conversation of August 14, Lansdowne had taken the 




matter as far as he could have without a reciprocal move by Hayashi in 
his official capacity. 
Hayashi's motives in communicating his version of the talks to 
the Japanese government are not difficult to discern. He was highly 
excited by the prospect of concluding the alliance which he had worked 
toward for the preceding eighteen months, and he wished to paint a rosy 
picture for Tokyo. If the prospects of obtaining an alliance with 
Britain appeared good, perhaps the government might move with more 
dispatch in granting Hayashi the power of plenipotentiary to proceed 
with official negotiations. He knew that there was some support at 
home for Ito's pro.;..Russian inclinations, and it is likely that by over-
stating the British response to his approaches, he hoped to steal a 
march on this element within the government. 47 Whatever his intentions 
or hopes, the conversation of August 14 put the responsibility for the 
entire matter on Hayashits shoulders. He now either had to obtain 
official sanction for the British negotiations or discontinue his per-
sonal approaches to the British foreign office. 
It was fortunate for the Japanese that they were given an un-
earned respite by the dispersal of the British cabinet for their annual 
holiday during August and September. On September 21, Sone Arasuke, 
who had been the interim foreign minister, surrendered that position to 
Premier Katsura's appointee, Komura Jutaro. Komura, at the age of 47, 
was an experienced diplomat who had received his education at Harvard 
Law School and had served successively as minister to Korea, the 
United States, and Russia. Komura had recently distinguished himself 
47For a discussion of these points, see Spinks, "Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance," p. 326. 
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through his conduct of Japan's affairs at the Peking conference, and it 
was there that he became very suspicious of Russia's intentions in 
China. These suspicions were not eased by what he saw during his return 
from Peking to take up his duties at Tokyo. 48 
Komura showed an immediate interest in the Anglo-Japanese negoti-
ations. He even went so far as to ask one of his assistants to find out 
whether Great Britain had ever violated her obligations under an alli-
ance. The new foreign secretary then drew up a policy statement which 
the cabinet approved at a meeting on October 7. On October 8, Komura 
drafted a telegram to Hayashi embodying this policy statement, The 
British proposals for a ttdefensive allianceH had been carefully con .... 
sidered. Japan wished to cooperate for the preservation of the common 
rights and interests of both parties, and "to that end Japan welcomed a 
defensive treaty with Britain. 1149 Hayashi was therefore empowered to 
open negotiations, but he was to exercise due caution by maintaining 
communications on a strictly verbal basis until the conclusion of the 
alliance seemed certain. 
When Hayashi again met with Lansdowne on October 16, he put for-
ward a general sketch of the arrangement as it was contemplated by the 
Japanese government. He emphasized the primacy of Japan's interests in 
Korea, but he also noted a concern for events in Manchuria, as encroach-
ments there might be followed by expansion into Korea. Japan's policy 
with regard to China was viewed as identical with that of Great Britain; 
that is, the open door and maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
China. The alliance itself would be purely defensive in nature and 
48Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 170-171. 
49 Ibid. 
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would become operative only if one of the signatories were obliged to go 
to war with more than one foreign power in defense of the stated poli-
cies toward East Asia. Hayashi especially emphasized that the alliance 
would not be activated by a war involving only a single foreign power. 
In the case of a Russo-Japanese war, British neutrality would be 
sufficient. 50 
Lansdowne thanked Hayashi for his statement, and promised to 
refer it to the cabinet. He added that it appeared to him "to form a 
useful basis for discussion." Lansdowne's next statement revealed the 
effect of Selbourne's memorandum upon his thinking. He thought it poss-
ible "that the two Navies might with great advantage work together even 
in time of peace, each Power affording the other facilities for the use 
of docks, harbours, and coaling stations." Hayashi "cordially" agreed.51 
The proposals exchanged in this conversation were the essence of 
the alliance which would be signed on January 30, 1902. The similarity 
between Bertie's ideas and the substance of Hayashi's proposals is quite 
"d 52 ev1 ent. Both sides were already reasonably certain of how much the 
other would concede, and protracted preliminaries were thereby avoided 
when the conversations proceeded to the status of official negotiations. 
Why, then, did it take five months for the conferees to pass from unof-
ficial discussions to formal negotiations? And why were yet another 
three months required to conclude the agreement? 
50Lansdowne to Whitehead, October 16, 1901, BD, Vol. I, no. 105, 
pp. 96-98. 
51 Ibid. 
52Bertie's ideas had been "unofficially" communicated to Hayashi 
by Sir Claude MacDonald, British minister to Japan, who was home on 
leave during the summer of 1901. Hayashi drew the obvious conclusion 
that the British were apprising him in advance of their requirements so 
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When the Russians withdrew their demands upon China on April 5, 
1901, the most pressing reason.for an Anglo~Japanese understanding was 
temporarily- removed. Furthermore, it was not until September that 
Anglo-German relations had been dealt.a.telling blow as a result of an 
unhappy meeting between William and Edward. 53 . The German Empress 
Frederick, Edwardts favorite sister, had succumbed to cancer in August, 
and the British monarch had journeyed to Germany for the funeral. After 
having endured the strain of the.funeral, .Edward had been invited by the 
Kaiser to a luncheon at Wilhelmshohe .. The King arrived tired and hungry 
after the four-hour train trip from.Homburg, .but.he.was obliged to re-
view a massive guard of honor, sit through an unpleasant luncheon, and 
then retire to the drawing room where the Kaiser.proceeded to read to 
him a lecture on the errors of British foreign.policy. 54 When Lansdowne 
learned of these proceedings, it undoubtedly did.considerable damage to 
whatever willingness he might still have had to pursue a German alliance. 
Finally, the interim nature of the.Japanese government between 
June and October had made it practically impossible for the Japanese 
foreign office to undertake such a serious step as the opening of formal 
alliance negotiations with Great Britain. The result·of all this was an 
unwillingness on the part of either side to take the first step. The 
British had no sense of urgency and therefore.would not--the Japanese 
had no assurance of stability and therefore could not. 
that he could make the first move with more.certainty. A. M. Pooley, e~, 
The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James from 1900-1905 (London, 1915), pp. 121-122. 
53For details see Grenville, Salisbury, pp. 356-357. 
54William's usual tactlessness was manifested in such remarks as 
the one which referred to Edward's ministers as ''those unmitigated 
noodles." Ibid. 
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At this point, however, events in East Asia again intervened to 
emphasize the advantages of an alliance to both Britain and Japan. On 
October 5, 1901, the Russians presented proposals to Peking which 
attempted to make the restoration of Manchuria conditional upon the 
granting of mining concessions there to the Russo-Chinese Bank. This 
represented a threat to both Japanese and British interests in Korea 
and China, respectively, since the Russo-Chinese Bank was simply a 
puppet of the Russian ministry of finance. Such concessions as were 
demanded would have been tantamount to incorporation of Manchuria into 
the Russian Empire, and this was a circumstance which neither Japan nor 
. . ld 55 Britain cou countenance. 
Lansdowne was obviously committed to the idea of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance by the time of his conversations with Hayashi on 
October 16, but during the following two weeks he attempted to make 
doubly sure of his footing before he proceeded. He obtained the appro~ 
val of the cabinet for a direct approach to the Russians with a proposal 
which would have simplified m.a tters greatly. . The. next day, October 29, 
he held conversations with de Staal, the Russian minister, and requested 
the direct settlement of all Anglo-Russian.differences in China, Persia, 
56 
and anywhere else they conflicted. The unenthusiastic Russian re-
sponse to these overtures did not surprise Lansdowne. On the same day, 
Lamsdorff refused to communicate the draft of the proposed Russo-Chinese 
convention over Manchuria until it had been signed, and on November 2, 
he delivered a further rebuff to Lansdowne by informing him that British 
55Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 179. 
56For details of the approach to Russia, see Steiner, "Anglo-
Japanese Alliance," pp. 31-35. 
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proposals regarding Persia would not be considered. 
The Russian rejection of Lansdowne's offer for a direct settle~ 
ment closed the last avenue which might have been open for any- Anglo..-
Russian rapprochement in the fall of 1901. The rebuff also armed Lans-
downe for any confrontation which might.occur with those within the 
government who were unfavorably disposed toward the Japanese alliance 
project. He had now placed himself in a highly defensible position to 
counter any accusations that he had not given either Germany or Russia 
enough latitude to come to terms. 
Lansdowne had, all the while, been proceeding with the business 
of formulating the draft to Salisbury on October 25 for his approval, 
and he then submitted the draft proposal for the approval of the full 
cabinet on November 5. At this momentous meeting, Lansdowne, with 
strong support from Selbourne, carried the day. 57 The British counter-
draft was now ready for submission to the anxious Japanese. 58 
With the delivery of the first British draft to Hayashi the next 
day, Lansdowne moved to obtain a very significant concession for Great 
Britain. He told Hayashi that he had confined himself to the under-
standing at which they had previously arrived in preparing the draft, 
i.e., limited to China and Korea, but he 
felt bound to tell him that an Agreement limited in this 
manner seemed to be in some respects an incomplete solu-
tion of the question. . . The disappearance of Great 
Britain as a sea Power in the Far East would be a calamity 
• 
57see Grenville, Salisbury, pp. 402-403. 
58Komura had remarked to MacDonald that "if anything is to be 
done it should be done quickly." MacDonald to Lansdowne, November 1, 
1901, BD, Vol. I, no. 108, p. 99. Lansdowne immediately replied that 
"no time will be lost." He regarded the situation as "extremely hope-
ful." Lansdowne to MacDonald, November 1, 1901, Ibid., no. 109, p. 99. 
to Japan, and it would make no matter to her whether such 
a calamity were to be brought about by a quarrel or1g1na~ 
ting in the Far East or by complications in some other 
part of the World.59 . 
He referred, of course, to the frontier which the British empire in 
Central Asia shared with Russia, and he thereby served notice to 
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Hayashi that he considered the limitation of the treaty to China and 
Korea a disadvantage to Britain. If Britain musLassume the liability 
of supporting Japan I s predominant interests ... in Korea, where Britain had 
little interest, then Japan should be willing to reciprocate by assuming 
a similar liability in India and points east. 
Hayashi replied that he "felt the force of this observation" and 
promised to convey it to the Japanese government. He also observed 
that he did not feel the treaty was broad enough regarding Japanese 
interests in ~orea, as it only provided for British assistance in case 
of absorption of Korean territory by another power. Japan, he felt 
sure, would wish to be protected "not only.against the complete absorp-
tion of Corea, but against any serious encroachments on the part of 
Russia in that country, or indeed, any action.on her part which might 
interfere with the preponderant influence exercised by Japan in many 
parts of Corea. 1160 Thus began the bargaining. 
One would expect the negotiations to have been concluded rather 
rapidly after the initial exchange of drafts, considering the great 
similarity between the interests of the two parties, but it was at this 
point that they hung fire. The first British counterdraft was delivered 
to Hayashi on November 6; it was not until December 12 that the Japanese 




were prepared to return their first counterdraft--a delay of five weeks. 
If both sides had been so anxious to conclude the agreement, why should 
the Japanese now hesitate? 
A number of reasons can be offered for what appeared to have been 
a deliberate stall by the Japanese. Obviously they had to have acer-
tain amount of time to prepare acceptable translations of the text, exa-
mine the British proposals, and to prepare counterproposals, but this 
should have taken no more than two weeks at the maximum. Several fac-
tors combined to extend this process for an additional three weeks. 
The first problem which confronted the Japanese was the illness 
of Komura, who was stricken with pneumonia in the second week of Novem-
ber. This complicated matters greatly, since the deputy foreign minis-
ter was out of the country and therefore unable to stand in for Komura.61 
The entire business therefore passed to Katsura, and for the greater 
part of November and the first week of December, it was the premier who 
did the lion's share of the work in obtaining the approval of the cabi-
net, the genro, and the Emperor for the transmission of the Japanese 
counterdraft. Despite these problems, Katsura was prepared to seek the 
approval of the cabinet on November 28. Because of Komura's continued 
illness, the cabinet met at his residence where they gave unanimous 
approval to the counterdraft. But when Katsura reported the results of 
the cabinet meeting to the Emperor the following day, he encountered his 
greatest stumbling block. The emperor refused to give his assent until 
the redraft had been referred to the genro and approved by them. 
61MacDonald to Lansdowne, November 28, 1901, Ibid., no. 113, 
p. 101. Furthermore, most of the rest of the government were absent 
from Tokyo for the autumn maneuvers, MacDonald to Lansdowne, November 
25, 1901, Ibid., no. 112, p. 100. 
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The genro were the remnant of the Meiji oligarchs.who had been 
gradually removed from the realm of active governmental service by their 
advancing ages. Nevertheless they stilLplayed an important part in the 
decision-making process. No premier, .and Katsura was no exception, 
could have undertaken a major departure from the traditional policy 
without first obtaining their approval. This proved to be the most 
time-consuming and difficult part of the precedµre, It was further com-
plicated by the aosence of Ito, one of the most influential of the 
genro, who had undertaken a journey to Russia via the United States, 
France, and Germany. Ito had begun his tour in September, claiming that 
he was goirtg abroad for his health, but fromthe very start, his trip 
raised speculations about the possibilities.of a Franco-Japanese loan 
and a subsequent Russo-Japanese rapprochement •. Such idle speculation 
was relatively undisturbing to the Japanese in September, before the 
negotiations with Britain took a rather sudden leap forward, but by 
November the increased talk of Itots true intentions gave Katsura some 
rather bad moments. 62 
The British were taking note of Ito's movements, and they were 
apparently none too satisfied that his mission was of a purely personal 
nature.63 Ito's trip animated Lansdowne. Whether he was really dis-
turbed is difficult to determine, but his official actions served 
62Nish details Ito's activities; see his Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
pp. 189-192. 
63MacDonald had been pressing the Japanese Foreign Office for 
assurances about Ito's trip and relaying the responses back to Lans-
downe. MacDonald to Lansdowne, November 25, 1901, BO, Vol. I, no. 112, 
p. 100; MacDonald to Lansdowne, November 28, 1901, Ibid., no. 113, 
p. 101. When Ito finally reached Russia, Lansdowne could not have been 
reassured by the reports from the British Ambassador there which indi-
cated the Russians were making a grandstand play for Ito's support. 
Scott to Lansdowne, December 11, 1901, Ibid., no. 114, p. 102. 
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notice to the Japanese that the British thought it improper for Ito to 
be engaging in such conduct at a time when Japan was committed to nego-
tiations with Britain. While Ito was in Paris, Lansdowne and Bertie 
called Hayashi in and sharply admonished him .concerning the Japanese 
. t . 64 H h . h d 11 1 d P . K procrastina ion. ayas 1 a persona y trave e to ar1s, at atsu-
ra's request, and explained the status of.the negotiations to Ito, 
emphasizing the primary role which Japan had played in their inception.65 
This had not deterred Ito from completing his journey to St. Petersburg, 
but he did consent to go directly to Russia with all dispatch and to 
stop in Britain on the return trip. 
Ito's travels placed the Japanese prime minister in a somewhat 
embarrassing position. Katsura was at a distinct disadvantage in 
attempting to communicate with him since he was already in Europe when 
the British counterdraft arrived. He could not order him back to Japan, 
for as a genro, Ito was by no means Katsura's inferior. Katsura was 
convinced that further delays would result in a British withdrawal from 
the negotiations, and that in such an event Japan would find herself 
isolated from both Britain and Russia. He therefore decided to place 
the matter before the genro again in a manner calculated to win their 
approval despite the absence of Ito. At a meeting with the genro on 
December 10, Katsura and Komura laid the records of the negotiations 
before that body and pointed out the fact .that the negotiations had 
66 been initiated by Japan. This changed the complexion of the matter 
64This was obviously intended as a protest against Ito's activi-
ties. Hayashi, Memoirs, pp. 145-147. 
65Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 186-187. 
66 Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
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entirely. -The genro realized that if Japan failed to carry through 
what she had begun, her international reputation would be considerably 
diminished. Furthermore, as the genro could not foresee the possibility 
of an alliance with Russia, they too became uncomfortable with the 
thought of isolation from both Great Britain and Russia. They therefore 
gave their approval for the government to conclude the negotiations with 
Britain on the basis of the policy statement of October 7, notwithstand-
ing a telegram from Ito on December 8, in which he expressed reserva-
tions about the alliance. The Emperor granted Katsura and Komura an 
audience on December 11, and he then instructed them to pursue the 
67 
negotiations without further delay. 
The meeting between Katsura, Komura, and the genro on December 10 
was a critical point in the course of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations. 
Komura's illness had been very fortunate for the Japanese in some re-
spects. It had given them a very valid excuse for three weeks of delay, 
but by the first week of December, its value was expended. Continued 
delay in replying to the British counterdraft would very likely have led 
to a withdrawal by Britain, and the Japanese fully appreciated the 
consequences of that. 
The Japanese lost no time in communicating their draft to the 
British. Hayashi met Lansdowne on December 12, and handed him the docu-
68 ment along with his apologies for the dela~ This marked the point in 
the negotiations from which there would be little chance of disruption 
or discontinuation. The British cabinet meeting of December 19 revealed 
67 Ibid. 
68Lansdowne to MacDonald, December 12, 1901, BD, VoL I, no. 115, 
pp. 102-103. 
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that the major bones .of contention which .remained to be removed were the 
Japanese counterproposals that attempted to fix British naval strength 
required in Asian waters and to guarantee Japan a completely free hand 
69 
in Korea. 
The Christmas holiday delayed the negotiations on the British 
side for another three weeks, as no cabinet was scheduled between Decem-
her 19 and January 13. Lansdowne, however, was sensitive to the Japan-
ese requests for haste, and he initiated a memorandum to the cabinet 
during the holiday period. 70 As a result, when the cabinet met again on 
January.13, he had a draft ready to be approved by that body. The re-
vised draft was approved and handed to Hayashi on .January 14, 1902. 71 
The Japanese made some concessions .on the strong.wording which 
they had employed in some places, and agreed to couch the description of 
their interests in Korea in somewhat vaguer -terms, but they refused to 
give much ground on the actual substance of .the agreement or to allow it 
to be extended to cover British interests in Central Asia. Lansdowne 
was somewhat more successful in modifying the provisions regarding the 
maintenance of a specific naval strength in Asian waters. The Japanese 
proposal had committed each ally to maintain "in the Far East a naval 
force superior in efficacy to the naval strength of any third Power." 
69 Lansdowne took advantage of a meeting with Hayashi after the 
Cabinet had met to raise once more the question of extension of the 
Alliance to cover British interests in Central Asia. Hayashi "replied 
emphatically •.. that it was useless to propose such an extension of. 
the alliance,t' Lansdowne then pointed out the other British objections. 
Lansdowne to MacDonald, December 19, 1901, Ibid., no. 117, pp. 104-105. 
70Lansdowne's memorandum was dated January 1, 1902, and it argued 
that the Japanese offer should be accepted as it stood. Monger, End of 
Isolation, p. 58. 
71N· h A 1 J All' 215 is , ng o- apanese 1ance, p. • 
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Lansdowne succeeded in modifying this considerably: "Great Britain has 
no intention of relaxing her efforts to maintain, so far as may be poss-
ible, available for concentration in the waters of the Extreme East a 
naval force superior to that of any third Power. 1172 
These last changes marked the conclusion of the actual bargaining 
process. The final British consideration and approval came at the cabi-
net of January 24. This was immediately communicated to the Japanese, 
and Komura agreed to the definitive British draft on January 25. He 
placed the final text before the Japanese cabinet and the Emperor on 
January 29, and received their approval to conclude the agreement. The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was officially concluded on January 30, 1902, 
h L d L d d B H h . . d h . L d 73 wen or ans owne an aron ayas 1 s1gne t e treaty 1n on on. 
Thus was Baron Hayashi's wish fulfilled. 
The alliance was a landmark in East-West relations. For the 
first time an Asian nation had concluded a military alliance with a 
western nation for the protection of mutual interests in East Asia. The 
premier European power of the day had thereby recognized Japan as a 
world power. Furthermore, the alliance was the result of political cir-
cumstances originating almost exclusively in East.Asia. Russian en-
croachments in Manchuria provided the stimulus for Japanese feelers to 
Britain in the spring of 1901, proved the worthlessness of the Anglo-
German agreement over China, and the renewal of these pressures in the 
fall of that year emphasized the importance of the alliance negotiations 
to both Britain and Japan. 
72For the details of the various drafts and the rev1s1ons which 
were made see Anglo-Japanese Agreement, January 30, 1902, BD, Vol. I, 
no. 125, pp. 114-120. 
73Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 216. 
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The alliance had very far-reaching effects upon the course of 
European diplomacy, aimed as it was at blocking Russian expansion in 
East Asia. There can be no doubt that both Britain and Japan viewed 
the alliance as a pacific means of containing the Russians. The ap-
proaches which Lansdowne had made to the Russians late in October, 1901, 
clearly demonstrate that the British saw the Japanese alliance not as an 
end within itself but as a vehicle which might facilitate the settlement 
of Anglo-Russian differences. The Japanese conception of the alliance 
was somewhat different. Obviously the Japanese were more concerned with 
the possibility of settling accounts with the Russians by combat, but 
it should not be concluded that this was their sole purpose in seeking 
the British alliance. Backed by the British navy, Japanese diplomats 
could negotiate with. the Russians from a position of strength and with a 
degree of confidence which they did not have previously. They must have 
also realized that the alliance could have the reverse effect, to stif-
fen the Russian determination to achieve their goals in East Asia. But 
the Japanese approaches to Russia after the signing of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance strengthen the conclusion that they did view the alli-
ance as a means of furthering the peaceful adjustment of their differ-
ences with the Russians. 
The Russians recognized full welLthe intent of Britain and 
Japan, and immediately approached their French allies with the request 
that they join Russia in a joint declaration in reply to the new alli-
ance. This the French consented to do in March, 1902, but they stead~ 
fastly refused to allow any extension of the Dual Alliance which might 
commit them to fight the British over Russia's East Asian adventures. 
In this refusal lay the genesis of the Entente Cordiale. The French 
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were quick to realize that the new alliance increased the dangers of an 
Anglo-French war should developments in East Asia result in a Russo-
Japanese war, and thus the way was prepared for the settlement of one 
of the most persistent rivalries in Europe. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February, 1904, sur-
prised almost no one; the major concern of most observers was that the 
hostilities in East Asia would draw the European allies of Russia and 
Japan--France and Great Britain, respectively--into the conflict with 
the result of a world war. This fear was not realized, however, for 
sixty days later, on April 8, Britain and France signed what has become 
known as the Entente Cordiale. This accord settled the outstanding 
difficulties between the two nations and greatly reduced the chance of a 
war between them as a result of the actions of their allies in East Asia 
The immediate consequences of this agreement were of considerable signi-
ficance, but the long-term results proved to be equally important. The 
Entente Cordiale was the primary vehicle which carried Britain and 
France into World War I as allies. The signing of the Anglo-French 
agreement of 1904 was therefore of monumental importance to the subse-
quent history of Europe, but the story cannot be told without noting 
that much of the impetus for this European event came from East Asia. 
Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, Anglo-
French relations were far from cordial. The competition between the two 
for world empire and for possessions in Africa in particular finally 
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brought them to the brink of war at Fashoda in 1898. 1 But 1898 marked a 
turning point for France, and consequently for Anglo-French relations. 2 
It was in this year that the diminutive and autocratic Theophile 
Delcasse became Minister of Foreign Affairs for France--a position which 
he would retain for the following seven years. Delcasse brought with 
him to the Quai d'Orsay considerable prestige as a result of his former 
3 
service in government and the distinct advantage of preconceived goals. 
Although bitterly embarrassed by the forced retreat at Fashoda, he did 
not change his conception of the ultimate goal of French diplomacy--an 
11 . b F G B . . d R . 4 a iance etween ranee, reat ritain, an ussia. Even as Captain 
Marchand lowered the French flag and marched .away from Fashoda, Delcasse 
was laying the diplomatic groundwork for the system of ententes through 
which he hoped to restore the prestige of France. 
Delcasse began his efforts to break out of the diplomatic isola-
tion in which the Bismarckian system had placed France by strengthening 
the Franco-Russian Alliance. Since 1893, this alliance had been the 
cornerstone of French diplomacy, but Fashoda had demonstrated that it 
1A perceptive analysis of Anglo-French relations very accurately 
described the situation five years before Fashoda. "They have a feeling 
that we [the British] are always getting the better of them all over the 
world, and crossing their path at the very point when it is about to open 
on some extraordinary advantage." Marquess of Dufferin and Ava to Earl 
of Rosebery, November 3, 1893, BD, Vol. I, no. 351, pp. 285-288. 
2oickenson, The International Anarchy, p. 54. 
3contemporary writing on Delcasse presents an interesting picture 
of the considerable personal prestige which he enjoyed. See Francis de 
Pressense, "The Fall of M. Delcasse and the Anglo-French Entente," 
The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. LVIII (July, 1905), pp. 22-33. 
See also Charles DawbarI1:-"Th~ophile Delcasse, The Man and His Policy," 
The Fortnightly Review, Vol. XCVI (December, 1914), pp. 474-479. 
4charles W. Porter, The Career of Theophile Delcasse (Philadel-
phia, 1936), p. 166. 
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was practically worthless as an effective tool for applying pressure upon 
an adversary. Delcasse achieved a significant strengthening of the 
alliance in 1899 and then turned his attention to other matters. By 
1903, primarily as a result of Delcasse's efforts, France no longer 
stood alone on the European scene. She had gained considerable influ-
ence in Spain as a result of the French foreign minister's assistance as 
the honest broker in the negotiations to end the Spanish-American War. 5 
Through further negotiations, Italy had been effectively separated 
from the Triple Alliance--morally, if not legally6--and, since a Franco-
7 
German rapprochement was a very unlikely prospect, Great Britain alone 
remained to be reconciled in this system of ententes. But despite the 
determined efforts of Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, the 
British remained aloof from e~rnest discussions which would have allowed 
the settlement of disputes on an equitable basis. 
Matters were beginning to look more favorable for the French, 
however. While the British were not ready for serious discussions on 
the problems which separated them from France, they were careful to 
avoid any action which might have unnece~sarily offended the French 
after 1901. Circumstances arose which made the British more cautious 
and ga~e them second thoughts in relation to France; although the French 
had no direct control over these developments, they are important to 
any examination of the later course of Anglo-French relations. 
5Ibid., pp. 162-164. 
6Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic: 
An Inquiry into Political Motivation and the Control of Foreign Policy 
(New York, 1931), p. 163. 
7 E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 
1870-1914 (New York, 1931), p. 204. 
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Within a period of eighteen months, Britain had gained a new mon-
arch and a new prime minister. Victoria had died in January, 1901, and 
Lord Salisbury finally retired from the premiership in July, 1902. 
Through these two events the officious and Germanophile Queen and the 
last stalwart defender of ''Splendid Isolation" were removed from the 
d . 1 . 8 1.p omatic scene. In their places came the personable, popular Edward 
VII and James Arthur Balfour. With Balfour as premier, Lord Lansdowne 
would have a free hand at the foreign office to pursue policies which. 
bore a closer relation to the realities of the situation on the Continent. 
Although some change had been evinced in the office after Lansdowne 
succeeded Salisbury as foreign secretary in 1900. Salisburyts retention 
of the premiership until 1902 had exercised a restraining influence on 
the reshaping of continental relationships. 9 
The Boer War provided another reason for reconsideration of the 
honored place which had been given to "Splendid _Isolation." This unfor ... 
tunate little war proved to the British that they were indeed isolated, 10 
since it aroused much ire in Europe, and the news was leaked to the 
British that plans were afoot among several of the powers to intervene 
in the conflict. Sentiment ran particularly high in Germany; within 
France, also, the war was viewed as a perfect example of the ruthlessness 
and hypocracy of British imperialism. The conduct of the war itself gave 
the British no comfort. It opened with embarrassing defeats and dragged 
8Porter, The Cal'.eer of Th~ophile Delcasse, p. 173. 
9Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist (Norman, Okla. 
homa; 1960), p. 70. 
10cambon attributed the conclusion of the Entente to the Boer War, 
which weakened Britain, and the Russo-Japanese War, which frightened 
both countries. Ibid., p. 88. 
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on for what seemed an eternity before an ov:erwhelming. numoer of Brittsli 
troops were finally able to bring the Boers to heel •. The British re.,.. 
ceived a very bad press all the while, and they were not notably adept 
at taking criticism of such a vituperativ.e nature. 
The Germans also contributed to the changed .. British attitude 
toward France. Britain had toyed with.the idea of closer ties with 
Germany for several years during the late .nineties,: .but by.the turn of 
the century she had become alarmed by German conduct. This alarm may 
be attributed to several factors; three, however, .are of primary impor-
tance. First, Germany picked this time to launch .a major naval construe-
tion program. The Navy Bill of 1900 .gav:e Admiral Tirpitz much of what 
he wanted in the way of naval construction, but it set in motion the 
wheels of reaction in Great Britain. The concept of the two-power navy 
was part and parcel of British strategy, and the German Navy Bill of 
1900 was interpreted as a direct challenge to this strategy--a challenge 
which could not go unanswered. ll Second,. German conduct during the Boer 
War, the personal actions of William II and the vindictiveness of the 
German press in particular, further alienated British public opinion and 
had an adverse effect upon those·elements within the.British government 
which hitherto had been favorably disposed toward Germany. Third, the 
continued coyness of the German foreign office in its conduct of negoti-
ations with the British on the subject of an Anglo-German entente fin-
ally began to strain British patience. 12 The British became suspicious 
11Raymond J. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New 
York, 1933), p. 88. 
12Apparently the Germans discounted the possibility of an Anglo-
French agreement and believed they could keep Britain.on a string. 
Pierre Guillen, L'Allemangne !!_ l'Maroc: de 1870 ~ 1905 (Paris, 1967), 
p. 674. 
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of German motives and attributed their hesitancy to a stalling strategy 
designed to give the:Gerrnans time to build to parity with Great Britain 
on the seas. It was.assumed that they would then dictate the terms of a 
colonial settlement or attack. Thus, by the.end of 1902, Anglo-German 
relations were at low tide, and the British were no longer seriously 
considering the possibility of an entente with.Germany. British public 
opinion was.becoming increasingly.anti-German and was beginning to look 
13 toward France as a friend and possible ally •. 
In the examination of the.events prior to 1903, the number and 
nature of the problems which separated France.and Britain must be re-
viewed. Two major and four lesser problems were on the French docket 
for consideration in the,eventuality of earnest talks with the British. 
All of the problems were of a colonial nature and of the type which 
have a tendency eventually to lead to conflict. 14 
Uppermost on the list were Egypt and Morocco. 15 France had 
missed the opportunity of a joint occupation of.Egypt in 1882 by hesi-
tating when the British acted to protect their interests on the Nile; 
however, the French still retained sufficient financial influence in 
Egypt to be a source of annoyance to the British. Britain's occupation 
was to have been a temporary measure, but by .1902 twenty years of "tern-
porary" occupation had passed with no end in sight. Although France 
could not seriously threaten the British position, she could inflict 
13oran J. Hale; Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution: A Study 
in Diplomacy and the·Press, 1904-1906 (Philadelphia, 1931), pp. 253-254. 
14Eubank, Paul Carnbon, p. 89. 
15christopher Andrew, Th~ophile Delcasse and the Making of the 
Entente Cordiale (New York, 1968), p. 211. 
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diplomatic pinpricks, and Britain would be only too happy to be rid of 
this nuisance. 
The quid pro quo for the abandonment of French claims in Egypt 
was British recognition of the primacy of French interests in Morocco. 
France looked upon Morocco as the logical extension of her empire in 
North Africa, and it was most certainly an .open gate for any adversary 
who wished to put pressure on the French in Algeria. 16 The prospect of 
abandoning Morocco to the certainty of French possession, however, 
raised an issue which was of concern to every British diplomat: the 
control of the Straits of Gibralter. The British were hesitant to see 
this fall into the hands of a powerful colonial .rival without the 
moderating effect of multilateral controi. 17 
Newfoundland held a prominent position on the list of issues to 
be settled. Here France held definite and longstanding rights which 
dated from the Treaty of Utrecht and which had been confirmed in the 
Treaty of Paris in 1763, Under these treaties, France had been guaran-
teed the rights to a lortg stretch of coast, known as the French Shore, 
which was valuable both as a fishing ground and as a training school 
for future members of the French navy and merchant marine, · A prol:Hem 
had existed for several decades in the exercise of tliose rights, fil>wever. 
When Newfoundland achieved self-governing status~ it refused to honor 
the terms of the treaties and passed legislation in 1885 which hampered 
the operations of French fishermen. Continued protests were to no 
16Eubank, Paul Cambon, p. 74. 
17Monger lists neutralization of the Straits of Gibralter as the 
first among Lansdowne's conditions for abandoning Morocco to France. 
Monger, The End of Isolation, p. 129. 
avail, and no clear solution to the problem had been found as of 
1903. 18 
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Lesser problems also existed between the French and British in 
Siam, the New Hebrides, and Madagascar, 19 but these were of a less 
critical nature and constituted more of a nuisance factor than real 
threats to the peaceful conduct of affairs. Yet the importance of 
disposing of them should not be ignored, for it is the accumulation of 
such minor annoyances which can often precipitate war when a major 
source of irritation arises. 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 rendered the British much 
less receptive to French advances during the ensuing eighteen months. 
By the terms of this treaty, if either of the contracting parties became 
involved in a war with two powers, the other was committed to armed 
support of that party. Herein lay the key to the developments to be 
considered below. The British entered into this agreement as a pre-
cautionary measure; its purpose was to forestall a Russo-Japanese 
rapprochement and to improve Japan's bargaining position, thus facili-
tating a peaceful settlement by bringing Russia to reason. 2° For a 
while the alliance appeared successful in achieving its goals. Russia 
had negotiated a convention with China in April, 1902, which provided 
for the evacuation of Russian forces from Manchuria and seemed to be 
the harbinger of a more pacific Russian Far Eastern policy. With the 
18Graham H. Stuart, French Foreign Policy (New York, 1921), 
pp . 12 3 -12 5 . 
19rbid., pp. 121-123. 
20E. W. Edwards, "The Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French 
Agreement of 1904," History, Vol. XLII (1957), p. 20. 
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Russo-Japanese see-saw thus balanced and Alsace-Lorraine as a permanent 
barrier to any Franco-German accord, Britain had little reason in 1902 
to feel compelled to strike a bargain which would require substantial 
concessions to France. 
By early summer of 1903, however, the continued procrastination 
by Russia in fulfilling her agreements in East Asia had transformed the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance from a negative into a positive factor in the 
initiation of Anglo-French negotiations. 21 As Japanese impatience with 
the continued Russian occupation of Manchuria grew, so did British 
anxiety. The British willingness to make meaningful concessions to the 
French in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement of Anglo-French 
problems increased correspondingly. Under no circumstances did the 
British wish to see the casus foederis of their alliance with Japan 
become operative as would be the case should France become involved in 
the conflict which appeared imminent. 22 
Concurrent with these developments in East Asia was Edward VII's 
visit to Paris in 1903. Edward quickly won the hearts of the Parisians, 
and by the time of his departure public manifestations of affection for 
the British monarch bore witness to the success of his visit. 23 This is 
important, for although the diplomatic initiative had come from France 
for several years, the French public had been slow to forget Fashoda; as 
21of all the problems facing the British, Monger has termed those 
in the Far East as"· .. the most serious of them all." He noted that 
" at the end of April, it suddenly flared into life again, more 
urgent, more dangerous, than all the others." Monger, The End of Isola-
tion, p. 123. -- -- -
22schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 168. 
23Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 
(Chicago, 1930), pp. 86-87. 
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a result, the French diplomats had been working ahead of the country at 
large in approaching Britain for a rapprochement. 24 
In Britain, the reverse was the case; British public opinion 
had for some months past been favorably. inclined toward a rapprochement 
with the French. It was the government which dragged its feet on that 
side of the Channel. Cambon had communicated the signs of improvement 
in the public disposition to Delcasse on several occasions in the early 
spring. 25 It should be noted, however, that it was not until the 
reappearance of trouble in the Far East during the early summer months 
that the British government began to evince a change of attitude. By 
the time of the French President's arrival.in London during the first 
week of July, it appeared that the.government had concluded that it 
must come to an accord with the French to protect Britain from the 
26 
danger of entanglement in the event of a Russo~Japanese conflict. 
Delcasse accompanied President Loubet on the visit to London 
and during the stay there, he met with ,the British foreign secretarr, 
Lord Lansdowne. The results of this meeting are interesting and signi-
ficant. After covering the other minor .areas of disagreement rather 
summarily, Delcasse put forward the two major points of interest to 
2411Delcasse was, however, not representative of France, not even 
of the French government .... Hatred of England died hard; Fashoda 
was still a painful memory." Sontag, European Diplomatic History, p. 92; 
This judgment was confirmed by the British Ambassador to Franc~ Monson 
to Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, BD, Vol. I, no. 353, p. 290. 
25cambon to Delcasse, March 13 and-April 13, 1903, France, 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, p_ocuments Diplomatigues Francais, 
1871-1914 (2nd Series, 1901-1911, l4 vols., Paris, 1931-32), Vol. I II, 
nos. 137 and 192, pp. 183-85 and 258-260. (Hereafter cited as DDF.,) 
26Lansdowne's conversation with Eugene Etinne revealed the 
changed British attitude. Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, BD, Vol. I, 
no. 356, pp. 292-293. 
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France:. British recognition of the primacy of French interests in 
Morocco and the principle of territorial compensation for French rights 
in Newfoundland. He ·emphasized to Lansdowne repeatedly that if agree-
ment could be reached over Morocco, he believed the remaining problems 
could be solved with a minimum of difficulty:. When Lansdowne.put for-
ward the question of Spanish interests in Morocco,· Delcasse assured him 
that they would be respected. He added that .. the neutrality of the Moroc,.. 
can coasts around the Straits of Gibralter would be.guaranteed, as would 
British commercial liberty in Morocco proper. .. Finally, he advanced the 
proposition of territorial compensation.for the surrender of exclusive 
French rights in Newfoundland as .a part .of .the comprehensive settlement.27 
Lansdowne accepted the three.points in .principle, But now, it 
was his turn. · After recapitulating .the .points .of interest to the two 
parties, Lansdowne mentioned the question of .Egypt .. which Delcasse had 
avoided. He made his point perfectly clear .just .by mentioning the 
subject, and he did not attempt any further discussion at this point. 28 
Egypt for Britain, Morocco for France: both parties knew well what they 
wanted. The problem which now remained was to determine the price each 
was·willing to pay. 
The implications of the Delcasse~Lansdowne .conversation of 
July 7, 1903, are manifold. Quite obviously the .British had decided 
that the time had come to resolve their problems with.the French and to 
achieve a comprehensive settlement-~even at the price of significant 
27oelcasse to Cambon, July 21, 1903~ DDF:, Ser. 2, VoL III, 
no. 362, pp. 471-473. 
28Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903, BD, Vol. I, no. 357, pp. 
294-297. 
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concessions. 29 For the French, of course, it was the crowning achieve-
ment of several years of hard work. But why had the British chosen 
this particular time? To answer this question, one needs only look at 
the course of events in East Asia,from April through June. 
By April, 1903, events in East Asia had _again taken on grave 
overtones, Russia failed to meet her obligations .under the convention of 
1902 which she had negotiated with China for the withdrawal of troops 
_ from Manchuria, and the Japanese attitude was ,becoming increasingly 
truculent. Delcasse received reports from Japan which indicated that 
the Japanese were reaching the limits .of their patience. The continued 
Russian dawdling and rumors of Russian war preparations were exciting 
public opinion. The Japanese were no longer playing the role of the 
patient, long-suffering Orientai. 30 
The reports from St. Petersburg gave no reason for optimism 
either. Ambassador Bompard reported to Delcasse on April 24 that he did 
not believe the Russians intended to evacuate Manchuria, and that in the 
final analysis, neither Russia nor Japan would be willing to make con-
cessions which would satisfy the other. 31 Russia gave further evidence 
of her intentions on April 28, when she presented China with a list of 
demands to be met before the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria 
would be ordered. The Chinese rejected these .out of hand, and the situ-
ation became increasingly tense over the next few weeks. The demands, 
2911There was only one way out: a close entente with France." 
Monger, The End of Isolation, p. 127. 
30Harmand to Delcasse, April 16 and.May 5,.1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. 
III, nos. 185 and 222, pp. 253-255 and 299-301; Durail to Delcasse, April 
28 and 29, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. III, nos. 204 and 206, pp. 282-283. 
31 Bompard to Delcasse; April 24, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. III, 
no. 194, pp. 265-267. 
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needless to say, caused a furor in Japan.32 Such tensions provided 
ample encouragement for both France and Britain to move toward a settle-
ment of their differences. 
Anglo-French negotiations got under way with a meeting between 
Lansdowne and Cambon on July 15. Cambon presented a more detailed state-
ment of the French proposals at this time, and Lansdowne brought the 
. f E . h . 33 issue o gypt into t e conversation. It was not until August 5, how-
ever, that Cambon was prepared to make a full statement of French pro-
posals. At this meeting Lansdowne informed him that Great Britain would 
expect French recognition of the British position in Egypt as the g_uid 
pro quo for British recognition of French interests in Morocco. Cambon 
raised the question of territorial compensation for the surrender of 
exclusive French rights in Newfoundland, and Lansdownets reply made it 
clear that this was going to be one of the more difficult problems to 
settle. 34 French public opinion would demand meaningful concessions for 
the surrender of such tangible rights, and such concessions would be 
equally difficult for Lansdowne to make without offending British public 
opinion. 
The British reply to the French proposals was not ready until 
October 1, The cabinet had been on vacation, and in addition a minis-
terial crisis in September had resulted in the resignations of Joseph 
32ourail to Delcasse, April 28 and 29, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. 
III, nos. 204 and 206, pp. 282-283. 
33cambon to Delcasse, July 22, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. III, no. 
363, pp. 473-476; Lansdowne to deBunsen, July 15, 1903, BD, Vol. I, 
no. 358, p. 298. 
34cambon to Delcasse, August 6, 1903; DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. III, 
no. 392, pp. 516-520; Lansdowne to Monson, August 5, 1903, BD, Vol. I, 
no. 364, pp. 306-307. 
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Chamberlain and several others. The British proposals, when theyfiilally 
came, were substantially what had been expected, and contained nothing 
more than a formalization of the views which Lansdowne had expressed in 
the meeting of August 6~5 It was now a matter of time and bargaining. 
On October 14, the two governments signed an arbitration treaty}6 
and conversations proceeded on the nature of the settlement. Throughout 
October and November, Lansdowne and Cambon continued to bargain over the 
price of compensation for French rights in Newfoundland and the details 
of the settlement in Egypt and Morocco. 37 Lansdowne drove a hard bar-
gain over these points, but on December 11, it appeared that the war of 
nerves was beginning to disturb him somewhat. In his conversation with 
Cambon on that date, he expressed great concern over the worsening situa-
tion in East Asia. He noted that Britain was not bound to give assis-
tance if Japan became engaged in a war with only one power, but he ex-
pressed some fear of the reaction of British public opinion to the out-
break of a Russo-Japanese war. He requested Cambon to ask Delcasse to 
intervene in St. Petersburg to quiet the situation, and he promised to 
work to that end in Tokyo. The situation, he feared, was becoming very 
38 
grave. 
35Lansdowne to Cambon, October 1, 1903, BO, Vol. I, no. 369, 
pp. 311-317. 
36cambon to Delcasse, October 14, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 10, p. 18; Lansdowne to Monson, October 14,-yg-03, BO, Vol. I, no, 
371, pp. 318-319. 
37cambon to Delcasse, November 4 and 22 and December 11, 1903, 
DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, nos. 59, 98, and 120, pp. 83-84, 127-129, and 
173-174. 
38cambon to Delcasse, December 11, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 121, pp. 175-176; Lansdowne makes no mention of this in his dispatch 
to Monson. Lansdowne to Monson, December 11, 1903, BO, Vol. I, no. 380, 
pp. 333-334. 
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The developments had indeed become threatening. Two factors in 
particular contributed to further alarm among the British. The Russian 
moves toward Manchuria and Korea continued. First, the Russians were 
working feverishly to complete the railway system.in Manchuria to facil-
itate the movement of troops and supplies to the East. This would indi-
cate that anything but a withdrawal was being planned. Secondly, the 
Tsar appointed a viceroy for the Far East .who was made responsible to 
him alone. The viceroy was given the duty.of.maintaining.order and 
security. The British interpreted .this as a preliminary to further 
annexations by the Russians. 39 They knew full well that any such move 
would make war unavoidable. 
The first weeks of October brought rumors of Japanese mobiliza-
tion as a result of the continued Russian refusal to evacuate Manchuria. 
The reports to the French foreign office noted the possibility of a 
Japanese landing in Korea. 40 The Japanese evidently believed the Rus-
sians to oe building fortifications along the Korean border, and the 
continued arrival of Russian army and naval reinforcements at Port 
Arthur did not quiet these fears. The report of the French ambassador 
at Peking on November 7 revealed the-reason.behind.the build ... up. The 
negotiations with China for the evacuation .of Manchuria were broken off, 
and Russian troops reoccupied the strategic city of.Mukden. 41 By the 
first week of December, war appeared to be only a matter of time. 
39Lt.· co'!. d'Amade to General Andre, August 24, 1903, DDF, Ser .. 2, 
Vol. III, no. 406, pp. 538-540. 
40col. Moulin to General Andre, September 30, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, 
Vol. III, no. 448, pp. 593-595; Boutirqn to Delc~sse, October 1, 1903, 
DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. III, no. 450, p. 596. 
41ourail to Delcasse, Noveiµber. 7, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 63, pp. 87-88. · 
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Russia and Japan continued to negotiate on the problem throughout 
December, but by the first week of January, it was obvious that the 
Russian attitude had pushed the,Japanese to the limit of their patience. 
Not only had Russia continued to refuse to evacuate Manchuria--a point 
which the Japanese might have conceded had .the Russians not seemed 
intent upon taking Korea--but they now raised their demands with regard 
to Korea by insisting upon the delimitation of the Japanese sphere of 
influence at the thirty-ninth parallel. 42 On January 6, the French 
foreign office received a report from Seoul that the Japanese were land-
ing supplies and munitions in Korean ports. There were also reports of 
numerous Japanese soldiers in civilian garb in the port cities, and the 
French ambassador assumed that the landing of Japanese forces in Korea 
was imminent. 43 On January 14, in their final response to the Russian 
proposition, the Japanese refused to consent to a partition of Korea at 
thirty-nine degrees or to recognize the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria. 44 
Meanwhile, the conversations between Cambon and Lansdowne con-
tinued through December and into January without any substantial pro-
gress. For all practical purposes, the major issues, Egypt and Morace~ 
had been settled shortly after the conversations began. The problem 
which remained to be. settled was the extent of the territorial compen-
sation which France should receive from renouncing her exclusive rights 
42ttarmand to Delcasse, December 20, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 130, pp. 189-198; Delcasse to Cogordan, January 6, 1904, DDF, Ser. 
2, Vol. IV; no. 155, pp. 220-221. 
43Fontenay to Delcasse, January 6, 1904 DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 156, pp. 221-222. 
44Harmand to Delcasse, January 14, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 177, pp. 247-248. 
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in Newfoundland. The French had first proposed that Britain cede the 
colony of Gambia, a narrow enclave of territory intruding into the 
French colony of Senegal on the west coast of Africa; but Lansdowne re-
fused to consider the suggestion. The French finally abandoned hope of 
concession on this point and suggested a significant rectification of 
the border of northern Nigeria and the French Sudan. This the British 
also refused; they offered, instead, what Delcasse referred to as 
":Shreds" of territory north of Sokoto, Nigeria. Needless to say, the 
French rejected this offer as completely insufficient, and the talks 
came to a standstill by the middle of January. 45 
Cambon met with Lansdowne on January 18 and suggested that he 
take the problem of compensation before the cabinet once more. Somewhat 
46 
pessimistically, Lansdowne agreed. The British .apparently appreciated 
the gravity of. the situation. 47 Events. in East Asia. were becoming more 
critical with each day that passed, and .obviously the French had reached 
the limit of their patience with the British on the matter of territorial 
compensation. When Lansdowne met with Cambon .on January 23, he brought 
with him an offer of more significant proportions than had been pre-
viously made. It granted the right of passage through Nigeria to those 
45For a summary of the bargaining on.this point, see Delcasse to 
Cambon, January 16, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, no. 184, pp. 257-258; 
also Lansdowne to Monson, January 13, 1904, BD, Vol. I, no. 384, pp. 
377-338. 
46cambon to Delcasse, January 18, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, no. 
196, pp. 272-273. 
47 At this point Crom·er. telegraphed Lansdowne from Egypt: "To 
allow negotiations to break down now would in my opinion be little short 
of a calamity, whether from the general or the local Egyptian point of 
view. . . ·. I cannot but think that this point, which appears to me of 
the utmost importance, would be understood in England and would serve 
as an adequate justification for some concessions elsewhere." Cromer to 
Lansdowne, January.24, 1904, BD, Vol. I, no. 387, pp. 339-340; 
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parts of the French Sudan made inaccessable by the rapids of the Niger 
River; it offered a rectification of the frontier of Gambia which would 
give France access to the Gambia River below its rapids; a parcel of 
territory marked by a semicircle around Sokoto, Nigeria, would be ceded; 
and the border of French and British lands on 'Lake Chad would be altered 
to give France territory which would permit construction of a road in 
that region. Cambon was obviously pleased by this turn of events, and 
while he maintained his reserve perfectly, he commented that he believed 
it would be useful to continue the discussions. 48 
Clearly, Delcasse was interested in the British offer, and on 
January 26, he instructed Cambon to request clarification on certain 
points of the proposai.49 Cambon accordingly obtained a letter from 
Lansdowne on February 5, which attempted to give greater clarity to the 
British offer.SO Delcasse was still not satisfied with the extent of 
the concessions, and on February 18, Cambon introduced a new demand for 
the cession of the Iles de Los in the bay outside Konakry, French 
Guiana. 51 Again Lansdowne went before th:e cabinet, and at a meeting 
with Cambon on February 25, after a bit of verbal fencing, he consented 
to cede the Iles de Los to France. 52 
48cambon to Delcasse, January 24, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 212, pp. 286..-288; Lansdowne to Monson, January 23, 1904, BD, Vol. I, 
no. 388, pp. 340-341. 
49oelcasse to Cambon, January 26, 1904, DDF:, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 217, p. 295. 
SOLansdowne to Cambon, February 5, 1904, BD, Vol. I, no. 389, 
pp. 341-343. 
Slcambon to Lansdowne, February 18, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 287, pp. 372-375. 
52cambon to Delcasse, February 25, 1904, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 316, pp. 217-419. 
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For all practical purposes, the Entente Cordiale was concluded. 
The discussions dragged on through March as a result of Delcasse's 
efforts to pry still a few more concessions from the British, but when 
he attempted to reintroduce the question of territorial compensation, 
Lansdowne threatened to break off the negotiations on March 31. 53 This 
quickly sobered the French foreign minister, and on April 8, 1904, the 
formal agreements were signed. 
What broke the logjam and brought about the conclusion of the 
agreement after so long a time? Once again, the events in East Asia, 
which became so critical during the last two weeks of January and which 
finally erupted into war during the first week of February, deserve the 
greater share of the credit. 54 To explain fully the relationship be-
tween Anglo-French negotiations and the Russo~Japanese quarrel, however, 
one must examine the respective viewpoints of the British and the French 
as to the possible consequences of a Russo-Japanese war for them. 
From the beginning, the British .viewed the prospect of a Russo-
Japanese war with more alarm than did the French. Although the terms 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not require .the British to render 
assistance unless Japan became involved in a war with two powers, the 
British feared that they might be forced to intervene anyway. They did 
55 
not hold a very high opinion of the prowess of the Japanese military; 
it was feared that if Japan did become embroiled in a war with Russia, 
53Lansdowne to Monson, March 31, 1904, BD, Vol. I, no. 408, 
pp. 359-360. 
54A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy 1783-1919, (3 vols., New York, 1923), Vol. III, 
p. 310. 
55Monger, The End of Isolation, p. 126. 
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she would be crushed. This was an eventuality which the British were 
not prepared to stand by and accept. It would mean the destruction of 
the British position in East Asia, and it was doubtful if British public 
opinion would tolerate the imposition of a harsh settlement by the 
Russians upon the Japanese. Furthermore, the .British were never quite 
able to free themselves from the spectre of a continental coalition. 
Germany remained the unknown quantity, and the British were inclined to 
believe that should the conflict spread, Germany would cast her lot with 
Russia and Franc~ and Britain would find herself in desperate straits. 56 
It was no accident that Lansdowne's decision to talk with Del-
casse in July, 1903, followed upon the heels of a worsening in the 
R J . . 57 usso- apanese s1tuat1on. On several occasions after the negotiations 
began, Lansdowne approached Cambon on the .subject of Russo-Japanese or 
Anglo-Russian relations and inquired about possible ways of ameliorating 
them. In the meeting of December 11, 1903, Lansdowne gave Cambon his 
assurances that Britain did not desire to become involved in the course 
of events in East Asia, and Cambon reciprocated for France. 58 With the 
outbreak of war in February, the two met again and gave mutual assur-
h h d . d f h fl' 59 Th d 1 . ances tat t ey es1re no part o t econ 1ct. ese ec arat1ons 
probably gave some reassurances to the British, and can no doubt be 
credited with increasing their hesitance in making territorial conces-
56 Sontag, European Diplomatic History, p. 89. 
S';bneauthor does attribute the timing to coincidence, however. 
He concludes that there was not sufficient cause in July to postulate a 
Russo-Japanese conflict.· Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 286-287. 
58cambon to Delcasse, December 11, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 121, pp. 175-176. 
59Eubank, Paul Cambon, p. 90. 
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sions to the French throughout December and the greater part of January. 
The concessions of January 24 and February 25, however, indicate British 
unwillingness to push their luck to the point of allowing the negotia-
tions to collapse. It was a very well-timed bit of work on their part. 
To understand the French conduct throughout the course of the 
negotiations, and during December and January in particular, it is 
necessary to examine the personal attitude of Delcasse toward the situa-
tion. The negotiations were the culmination of five years of hard work 
on Delcasse's part. An entente with Great Britain had been his avowed 
goal since he had assumed office in 1898. Until the East Asian situa-
tion had thoroughly disturbed the British in 1903, however, he had 
enjoyed little success in his labors.· But, whereas the British became 
convinced that genuine trouble was going to·. erupt between Russia and 
Japan, Delcasse refused to the last moment to believe that war would 
come. 60 To this disbelief can be attributed much of his insistance 
upon greater territorial cessions than the British were willing to 
61 
make. In either case, shouid war by chance come, he, like the British, 
felt certain that Russia would easily defeat the Japanese. He appar-
ently agreed with Cambon that France had a right to be difficult; she 
could afford to wait. 62 
60At a cabinet meeting on.February S, three d:ays before the Japan-
ese attack on Port Arthur, Delcasse firmly announced: "I'll answer for 
peace myself." Maurice Paleologue, Three Critical Years, 1904-05-06 
(New York, 1957), p. 15. 
61so persistant was Delcasse in his effort to obtain all possi-
ble that Lord Newton condemns his conduct and states that he"· •. im-
perilled the whole agreement by haggling over details in the final 
stages of the negotiations." Newton, Lord Lansdowne, pp. 293-294. 
62cambon to Delcasse, November 18, 1903, DDF, Ser. 2, Vol. IV, 
no. 89, pp. 115-116. 
68 
The coming of the war was a blow to Delcasse. He was obviously 
shaken by the surprise, and although he continued to haggle with the 
British for several more weeks and gained a few more concessions there-
by, the Russian reverses in the first eight weeks of the war weakened 
his bargaining position. 63 Out of fear of French public opinion, he 
tried to pry a final concession from the British in March, but in the 
face of Lansdowne's threat to break off negotiations he quickly dropped 
the matter and signed the agreements within the week. He, too, was 
unwilling to risk the dangers of the months of war ahead without an 
understanding with his neighbor across the Channel. 
In the final analysis it was the coming of the Russo-Japanese 
War, and the threat of world-wide conflict it brought with it, which 
brought both Britain and France to the realization that their differ-
ences had to be settled. The Entente Cordiale was the manifestation 
of that realization. But the true significance of the Entente was 
not limited to its effect upon Anglo-French relations. Just as the 
earlier Anglo-Japanese Alliance set in motion many of the forces which 
contributed to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, so this in turn 
aroused the diplomatic activity which culminated fifteen months later 
in the abortive Treaty of Bjorko between Germany and Russia. 
63Alfred Francis Pribram, England and the International Policy 
of the European Great Powers 1871-1914 (Oxford, 1931), p. 97. 
CHAPTER IV 
GERMANY AND THE TREATY OF BJORKO 
On July 23, 1905, Emperor William II boarded Tsar Nicholas' 
yacht, the Polar Star, for what proved to be a momentous occasion in 
the history of Russo-German relations, While the imperial yachts lay at 
anchor in the Bay of Bjorko for two days, William bombarded his younger 
cousin with warnings about the perfidy of Russia's European neighbors 
and complained bitterly of the thankless tasks which Germany had under-
taken for Russia's benefit during her hour of need, When William felt 
he had properly prepared Nicholas, he pulled a document from his pocket 
which he placed before the despondent Tsar. The rather melodramatic 
words of William describe the occasion very adequately: 
The Czar seized me by the arm, drew me into his father's 
cabin and closed all the doors. "Show it [to] me please." 
The dreamy eyes sparkled. I drew the envelope from my 
pocket, unfolded the sheet on the writing desk of Alex-
ander III before the pictures of the Czar's mother, between 
photographs from Fredensborg and Copenhagen, and laid it 
before the Czar. He read the text once, twice, thrice. 
I pra:yed the dear God to be with us and guide the young 
ruler. It was deathly still; only the sea murmured and the 
sun shone joyfully and clear in the cozy cabin, and dir-
ectly before me lay the Hohenzollern and high in the morn-
ing air waved the imperial standard. I was just reading 
the letters on the black cross, God with us, when the Czar 
said, "That is quite excellent. I quite agree!" My 
heart beat so loudiy that I could hear it. I pulled my-
self together and said casually, "Should you like to sign 
it? It would be a very nice souvenir of.our entrevue." 
He read it once more and replied, "Yes I will." I opened 
the ink-well, extending to him the pen, and he wrote with 
a firm hand "Nicolas." Then he passed it to me, I signed 
it, and as I arose he, deeply moved, folded me in his 
arms and said, "I thank God and I thank you, it will be of 
most beneficial consequences for my country and Yours; 
You are Russia's only real friend in the whole world, 
I have felt that through the whole war .and I know it.'' 
Tears of joy stood in my eyes--to be sure the sweat 
poured from my brow and back--and I thought of Frederick 
William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather and Nicholas I. 
Were they near at that moment? At any rate they saw it 
all and were overjoyed. 1 
Thus was the Treaty of Bjorko concluded on July 24, 1905. 
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The history of the Treaty of Bjorko is, in a larger sense, the 
history of the deterioration of German foreign policy in the fifteen 
years following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, but its immediate 
genesis can be found in the sequence of events initiated by the signa-
ture of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. This alliance, as has 
been noted, relieved Japan's fears of a war with both members of the 
Dual Alliance if the Japanese eventually found it necessary to go to· 
war with Russia to protect Japan's interests in Korea. Japanese for-
eign policy therefore became less tolerant of Russian pretensions in 
Manchuria and more obviously intent upon settling the issue by combat. 
As this tendency manifested itself during the spring and summer of 
1903, the British became more fearful of finding themselves embroiled 
in a conflict with France as a result of the hostility of their respec-
tive allies. Lord Lansdowne, appreciating the gravity of the situation, 
welcomed .Delcasse I s advances in the summer of 1903 ,. and thus opened the 
way for the discussions which led to the entente between England and 
France in the spring of 1904. 
For all practical purposes the signing of the Entente Cordiale 
left Germany diplomatically isolated. Although the Triple Alliance was 
theoretically active, the Germans discounted its value because of 
lQuoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 283-284. 
71 
Austria's nationalities problems and Italy's suspected undependability..2 
The position of tmchaUeilged· strength from which German diplomats had 
spoken during the days of the Dreikaiserbund was. gone,; out its memory 
remained, William, in particular:, coul<,i. no.t bring. himself to accept 
this situation, 3 Just as Tantalus tried repeatedly to touch the cool 
waters with his parched lips only to watch them recede .. before him, so 
the Kaiser tried again and again t.o forestall the isolation of. Germany 
only to be rewarded with repeated frustrations. 
The Kaiser's disappointments were the result of flaws in the 
German political structure combined with an unfortunate combination of 
personnel at the highest levels of policy formulation. The direction 
of German foreign policy was not the result of a well-coordinated. 
effort, but was rather a contest of wills between three .individuals--
William II, Bernhard von Billow, and Friedrich von Holstein, and this 
situation was aggravated by another. There was insufficient communica-
tion between the various governmental agencies which.served as listen-
ing posts for the foreign office officials, and in many cases important 
information which should have affected the formulation of German for--
eign policy never reached either the Kaiser, Billow, or Holstein. 
Furthermore, several instances could be cited .which demonstrate that 
information was not freely shared among the three, and, accordingly, 
not one of them was ever in possession of what could be termed the 
2As one newspaper editor put it at the time: "If we were today 
• forced to fight Russia and France, not a single rifle would be.fired in 
Italy and Austria." M. Harden, "Der neue Trust," Zukunft, April 23, 
1904, quoted in.E. Malcolm Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, 1866~ 
1914 (New York, 1938), pp. 496-497. 
3william began to suffer from the l'Ii.fghtmare of the coalitions." 
Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 138. 
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"total picture." Simply put, this meant that the German government was 
often at odds with itself in the formulation and conduct of its foreign 
policy.4 This created very real problems, since foreign diplomats 
tended to assume that the military monarchy was the epitomy of preci-
sion. The myth of "Prussian efficiency" led foreigners to conclude that 
the Germans made no move without a purpose, when in fact, German diplo-
macy between 1902 and 1905 was often very poorly conceived and executed. 
The potential for distortion and confusion .which these circumstances 
introduced into the conduct of international relations can be readily 
appreciated. 
In recounting the events which led to Bjorko, three stories must 
be related, because the principle architects of German foreign policy, 
William, Billow, and Holstein, saw three ways for Germany to avert dipl6-
matic isolation after 1904. The Kaiser,with his usual penchant for the 
grandiose, believed the solution lay in a combination of the Dual and 
the Triple Alliances. 5 To achieve this merger, William planned to 
negotiate an alliance with Nicholas:·n, who would then secure the adher-
ence of the French while William brought the Hapsburg Empire and Italy 
into the arrangement. If William were successful in this venture, Ger-
many could expect to wield considerable influence as the senior partner 
on the continent, and the British would be forced to either acquiesce or 
face the dangers of opposing a powerful coalition~. -If-the Tsar were 
unable to bring the French into the proposed alliance, .the Dual Alliance 
would be disrupted and France would be forced to seek closer ties with 
4Jonathan Steinburg, "Germany.and the Russo-Japanese War," 
American Historical Review, Vol. LXXV (1970), pp. 1965-1966. 
5Raymond J. Sontag, "German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906," American 
Historical Review, Vol. XXXIII (1928), p. 280. 
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Great Britain. But with the Russo-German frontier guaranteed by treaty, 
Germany would be unimpressed by an Anglo-French alliance. In the event 
of war it would not save Paris, for the Germans were quite aware that 
"the English ships have no wheels. 116 
Holstein, however, not only realized the improbability of such 
an accomplishment, but denied its desirability as well. He believed 
that Germany should first attempt to conclude similar agreements with 
both Britain and France and thereby nullify the importance of the 
Anglo-French entente as a diplomatic coup. If this procedure failed, 
Germany would have to score a diplomatic triumph over France through a 
policy of veiled threats backed by the German military, thus demonstrat-
ing the essential worthlessness of the Anglo-French entente and 
emphasizing Germany's international importance. Holstein's alternative 
clearly demonstrated the bankruptcy of German diplomacy by 1904. He 
had fallen back upon the old policy of Machtpolitik which had failed 
during the 1890's. 7 
Somewhere between William's Russophile tendencies and Holstein's 
mailed fist, Billow took his position. The chancellor is the most diffi-
cult of the three to analyze because of his eclecticism. He could 
adopt an independent position only to a degree, for when it came into 
open conflict with William's opinions, Billow was usually obliged to 
give way to maintain the security of his office.8 On the rarer 
6Holstein to Hugo von Radolin, July 13, 1905, Norman Rich and 
H. M. Fisher, eds., The Holstein Papers (4 vols., Cambridge, 1955-1963), 
Vol. IV, no. 902, p. 353. (Hereafter cited as HP.) 
7sontag, "German Foreign Policy," p. 280. 
8An excellent example of this was Bi.l'low's attempt to moderate 
William's overtures to Nicholas in the months of December, 1903, and 
January, 1904. William haughtily replied that these were private 
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occasions when he opposed Holstein, he was confronted not only by a 
superior knowledge of international affairs but by a more powerful 
intellect as well, and he usually capitulated or compromised rather 
than risk Holstein's resignation. 9 Billow can be safely described as an 
intermediary between the Kaiser and Holstein who synthesized their 
thinking into something which could be called a third opinion. It is 
not too much to say that the Kaiser supplied Billow with an office and 
Holstein supplied him with thoughts. 10 
Holstein's thoughts, however, had ceased to offer viable alter-
natives for German foreign policy long before the spring of 1904. He 
was extremely hesitant to make significant concessions to Great Britain 
before the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as a result 
Germany lost what proved to be the last chance to achieve an entente 
with Britain in 1901. Holstein wrote.on December 31, 1901, that "at 
the present day Germany with her enormous strength on land and sea is a 
factor which no power that wishes to perform.an important act dare 
leave in its rear without having previously come to an understanding 
letters and advised the -Chancellor to mind his own business. Anderson, 
First Moroccan Crisis, p. 138. Holstein complained earlier _that Bulow 
was-afraid to combat anti-English feeling for fear of estranging him-
self from the Kaiser. Diary Entry, November 11, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, 
no . 812 , p . 2 72 . 
9Billow was very much on the horns of a dilemma in the summer of 
1905 when Holstein became angered by the Kaiser's persistant conduct 
of a diplomatic course contrary to that outlineq by the foreign office 
and therefore offered his resignation. Holstein to Billow, September 19, 
1905, HP, Vol. IV, no. 913, p. 373:. 
lOHolstein described Billow to his-diary: "In some ways I feel 
sorry for Billow. He is not a strong character, and up till -now has 
achieved everything by amiability and his cleverness in .taking people. 
But this by itself is not enough in the face of H,M. 's constantly grow-
ing awareness of his position as ruler. 1·1 Diary Entry, January 11, 
1902, HP, Vol. IV, no. 792, p. 245. 
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with her."ll This estimation of Germany's international importance may 
have been reasonably accurate, but Holstein had overplayed his hand. 
The fear of German reaction was not strong enough to deter Britain from 
a very uimportant actu on January 30, 1902. 
A memorandum which Holstein prepared for Billow in July, 1902, 
clearly demonstrated that he did not appreciate the magnitude of .the 
changes which the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance signaled. 
In accordance with your wishes I.have tried to do 
something about England •.•. In my opinion--and I am 
not the only one to hold it--the efforts now being made 
to represent England as irreconcilable and a·demonstra-
tive conciliatory gesture by the Kaiser as necessary are 
aimed against you •••. I for my part would speak u~ 
without hesitation if I saw the least danger from England. 
On the contrary, however, I think that.all this 'crying 
wolf' and all these so-called 'warnings' are utter ·.non-
sense. Those who originated these warnings don't believe 
them themselves; it is all designed to work on the excit-
able nature of the Kaiser. 
'Meeting them half-way' is not going to achieve any-
thing .•.. Nothing demonstrative, everything must be 
done quietly and gradually.12 
Obviously, Holstein's confidenc~ was not easily shaken. His reserved 
attitude can be partially explained by the absence of any clouds on 
Germany's horizons six months after Britain and Japan had allied them-
selves. The Anglo-German flirtation during the spring .and summer of 
1901 had brought Delcasse to attempt to approach Germany twice, 13 while 
the Russians would make overtures at the September meeting between 
William and Nicholas at Danzig. The conversations at Danzig only rein-
forced Holstein's confidence in his analysis of the German position, 
11Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 79. 
12Holstein to Bernhard von Billow, July 29, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 803, pp. 257-258. 
l3carroll, French Public Opinion, pp. 200-201. 
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for there the Russian foreign minister had stated that "an alliance 
between Germany and Russia would be the greatest blessing and is a goal 
to be striven for. 1114 Feeding upon itself, German complacency waxed 
fat. 
The equanimity with which Holstein awaited further developments 
was only superficially justified. Though the Franco-Russian approaches 
might have been indicative of a willingness to recognize Germany's 
status as a great power and a desire to cooperate with rather than con-
front her, the Germans,should not have expected their neighbors to 
stand, hat in hand, awaiting the Kaiser's pleasure. Indeed, by late 
autumn 1902, the signs of further change were appearing. But rather 
than taking warning from them, Holstein persisted in interpreting them 
with what increasingly appears as unwarranted optimism. In a memo-
randum dated October 1, 1902, he analyzed the international situation. 
The attitude of France is one of watching and waiting; 
as though they were trying to lure us into statements that 
might be exploited elsewhere, particularly in London .. 
After these experiences it does not seem advisable for 
us to continue to negotiate directly with France, ... 
If we continue confidential negotiations with Delcasse 
... we not only risk his ignoring our proposals in deal-
ing with others, but that he might spice them with a nice 
anti-English flavor and then communicate them confidentially 
to London. Because [of] this [the] entire behavior of 
Delcasse can leave no doubt that he at present regards a 
Franco-English understanding as the main goal of his policy . 
.!! would be unfortunate if this understanding~ brought 
about just because Delcasse was given the opportunity to 1 
present Germany to the English~ the villain in the piece. 5 
The specific negotiations to which Holstein referred were those for 
the evacuation of Shanghai by the German, French, and British troops 
14Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 78. 
15Memorandum by Holstein, October 1, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, no. 807, 
pp. 263-265. 
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who had occupied the city since the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, but the 
attitude which he evinced here was the one which permeated his thinking. 
He had, of course, noted the possibility of an Anglo-French rapproche-
ment, but he could not rid himself of what would appear to have been 
his b~te noire, chronic suspicion. 
Having thus raised the spectre of an Anglo-French understanding, 
Holstein proceeded to assure himself that though it might appear out-
wardly possible, in reality such an eventuality could not occur. 
As for the Franco-English rapprochement, in the pre-
sent world situation in which the existence of England 
is not threatened, there is .no English government that 
would dare come before Parliament .with·the statement that, 
with the exception of a narrow coastal strip around 
Tangier, all of Morocco had been -conceded to the French. . 
Before John Bull would concede that, he would have to 
feel much smaller than he does today, for now after the 
conclusion of the Boer War he again feels very big.16 
The most outstanding error in Holstein's analysis was his overestimation 
of British confidence after the.Boer War. The British were, if any-
thing, more certain than before that they should seek the security of 
further alliances. Germany, until 1902, had been high on Britain's 
list of potential allies, but the advice of Holstein had played an 
important role in alienating the British. He apparently could not now 
conceive of the British becoming concerned enough to make concessions 
sufficient to resolve the multitude of Anglo-French differences. 
The cogent summary which he had made of Delcasse's policy on 
October 1 seems to have been less satisfying to Holstein in November. 
On the third he wrote: 11 1 no longer understand French Near Eastern pol-. 
icy as conducted by M. Delcasse." He requested the German ambassador 
16rbid. 
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to Spain to 11ask your friend the Spanish Ambassador sometime in conver-
sation and without emphasis what in fact he thinks of Delcassets Mediter-
ranean and Near Eastern policy. 1117 It is strange indeed that he could 
not see what was so obvious. By the end of 1902 an Anglo-German entente 
was no longer a realistic possibility, and Holstein noted that "the 
minimum demanded by Germany's best friends in France was a retreat to 
the language frontier. II . . ' and that "as long as this view obtains. 
and I will hardly live long enough to see a change--all talk of a 
[Franco-German] rapprochement is pointless . 11 18 He had all of the fac-
tors catalogued, but he steadfastly refused to accept the conclusion to 
which they inevitably pointed--given time and a pressing reason, Britain 
and France would adjust their differences. 
Indications of a major power realignment continued to appear 
throughout 1903. Billow met with Metternich, the German ambassador to 
Britain, for a series of conversations in May, and a memorandum which he 
subsequently sent to Holstein demonstrates clearly that the German 
foreign office was not ignorant of the potential for change which 
existed. 
The English have long been inclined to reach an arrange-
ment with the Russians (whom they fear), if only the 
latter's demands weren't too high. In all attempts to 
achieve a rapprochement between Russia and England hither-
to, England has always been courting a recalcitrant 
Russia. The obstacle to an Anglo-Russian understanding 
has always lain in St .. Petersburg. The Russians are in-
triguing in London, but Eckardstein overestimates both the 
significance and the success of these mining operations. 
17Holstein to Hugo van Radolin, November 3, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 809, pp. 266-267. 
18Holstein to Hugo van Radolin, November 6, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 810, p. 268. 
Do you think the English might incite the Japanese 
to soften up the Russians and make them more desirous of 
an arrangement with England?l9 
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The question which Billow put does, of course, credit the British with 
a more sinister motive than the historical record appears to justify, 
but in formulating his closing question, Bulow had recognized a most 
important prospect. If a Russo-Japanese war were to occur, Britain 
might be able to exploit Russia's difficulties to achieve an adjust-
ment of their differences. 
An Anglo-Russian rapprochement could be achieved with greater 
ease, however, if it were to be preceded by an understanding between 
Britain and the other member of the Dual Alliance. Once again, Billow, 
in forwarding the opinions of Gotz von Seckendorff, emphasized the 
possibility of an.Anglo-French entente. 
No one in England thinks of attacking us; but there is 
a strong tendency in England to reach an understanding 
with France and in particular :with Russia--partly due 
to fear, especially of the latter Power, partly also 
because England feels the need of an ally but does not 
want us as an ally at this stage,.being cross with us. 20 
Here Billow noted trends that should have galvanized Holstein into 
action. The summer of 1903 was another of those periods of tension 
when it was generally thought pos·sible that Japan might attack Russia. 
The fear of which Billow wrote was Britain's concern that such an even-
tuality might involve her in a war with both Russia and France. It 
should have been obvious that the British would move to prevent such a 
development. 
19Bernhard von Billow to Holstein, May 15, 1903, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 815, p. 247. 
20Bernhard von Billow to Holstein, May 16, 1903, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 816, p. 275. 
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By the end of 1903, however, Holstein was still unwilling to 
abandon his policy of watchful waiting. Eventually he thought to win 
the war of nerves and enjoy the spectacle of one of the powers seeking 
an alliance on Germany's terms. He advised Bulow to "Stick fast by 
Bismarck's negative point of view. Foreign policy, like photographic 
development, cannot stand the light of day. 1121 
Such a negative approach had its limitations, and as ci:rcum~ 
stances in East Asia became more and more threatening, this fact became 
obvious to everyone except Holstein. The German foreign office had 
for some time thought that if Russia and Japan came to blows, Germany 
would receive formal requests from Russia for assistance. Such an 
occurrence would have placed Germany in the classical Bismarckian 
situation, that of tertius gaudens--the Dual Alliance and the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance confronting each other, and Germany committed to 
neither. 22 Under these circumstances the Germans might be able to 
extract considerable concessions for their support. Billow wrote to 
Holstein in January, 1904, that "it would of course be a good thing if 
•somewhere far away' the nations came to blows. 1123 Fishing in troubled 
waters is an ancient and honored pastime. 
21Holstein to Bernhard van Billow, November 21, 1903, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 817, p. 276. 
22otto van Milhlberg, the deputy state secretary, expressed these 
opinions after a meeting with the Russian Ambassador in July, 1903. 
Billow noted in the margin: "We shall have to deal with this matter 
with the greatest care and delicacy." Steinberg, "Germany and the 
Russo-Japanese War," p. 1067. 
23Bernhard van Billow to Holstein, January 16, 1904, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 818, p. 277. 
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The same letter which expressed Billow's hope for a nice little 
war "somewhere far away1' also put four very significant questions to 
Holstein. Bulow asked: 
1. All in all, do you think it would be better for us if 
there were a war in the Far East than if the storm were to 
pass? 
2. Do you think it completely impossible that in the latter 
case the Russians would for the time being act ~ith more 
caution in the Far East, and instead pay more intensive 
attention to their European policy than they have done 
in the last few years? 
3. Do you believe that the Franco-Russian alliance would 
survive a war in the Far East? 
4. Do you not believe that the war must definitely lead 
to a sharpening of the conflict between Russia on the one 
hand and England-America on the other, while if peace is 
maintained, Russia might .be tempted to cultivate her 
relations with England-America, and even Japan, more care-
fully in the future?24 
The second question revealed the one fear from which the Germans never 
truly freed themselves. It was the b~te noire of German diplomats. If 
Russia did not expand eastward she would turn her attention to Europe, 
and the expansion of European Russia would eventually result in a 
Russo-German conflict. The thought of the Russian hordes swarming over 
the Oder made German blood run cold. 
Holstein emphasized the importance of the strategic considera-
tions which Billow's questions raised. "The Far Eastern question can 
be postponed," he replied, 11 the Balkan question can not. The latter 
rests on popular sentiment, the former does not." As for the possibil-
ity of an Anglo~Russian rapprochement, Holstein thought it "out of the 
question, because America has taken an anti-Russian stand and England 
will and must remain on the same side as America." He thought.it prob-
able that the Dual Alliance would survive a warin the Far East, "but 
24 Ibid. 
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(here he demonstrates his priorities), not-a war in the Balkans." As 
for Germanyrs attitude, Holstein left little doubt about the course 
which should be pursued: 
One can truly say that during the whole of its existance 
the Russian Empire has never had so many.enemies at once 
as now. Germany would shoulder no easy task if she were 
to take over all these enemies. In fact it is impossible 
to give a diplomatic opinion without basing it on m~si-
tary and naval appreciations of the power position. 
Obviously, vacillation is not one of the charges which may be 
brought against Holstein. These words which he penned in January, 
1904, convey essentially the same advice as those he wrote in December, 
1901. 26 Germany must stand aloof and await the moment when her power 
would be decisive. She could then command the maximum price for her 
favor. In other words, "Nothing demonstrative, everything must be done 
quietly and gradually . 11 27 
Gradualism, however, held no appeal for the Kaiser. It was with 
increasing difficulty that Billow exercised a restraining influence upon 
William. It would appear that Germany had at least one individual who, 
as Addison said, was willing to "tide in the whirlwind and direct the 
storm." William was obsessed by the idea of an alliance between the 
Houses of Hohenzollern and Romanoff, .. and he .was. furthermore convinced 
that he could obtain his goal through the strength of his personal 
influence over the Tsar, Nicholas II. This obsession was intensified 
when William realized toward the end of 1903 that Delcasse was on the 
25Holstein to Bernhard vori Billow, January 17, 1904, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 819, pp. 277-278. 
26cf. footnote 11, page 76 above. 
27Holstein to Bernhard von Billow, July 29, 1902, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 803, p. 258. 
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verge of completing that series of ententes which would unite France, 
Italy, Spain, and England in a series of interlocking agreements. This 
impending circumstance made the Russo-German alliance project appear 
even more imperative to him, for it was the first step toward the real-
ization of his scheme for a continental league. 
The Russians, however, were not eager for closer ties with Ger-
many, a fact which left William in need of some event which would 
emphasize the.importance of German friendship to the Russians. This, a 
Russo-Japanese war would do nicely, and .for this reason the Kaiser took 
every opportunity to urge the Tsar to be.resolute in his relations with 
the Japanese. His moods fluctuated in a direct ratio with his estirna-. 
tion of the chances for war, Billow recounted a very enlightening 
incident. 
When the Kaiser received a telegram from-the.Tsar on 
January 21, 1904, that is to say .more than a fortnight 
before the outbreak of hostilities, expressing the hope 
that peace would not be jeopardized, His Majesty was 
much cast down. He feared that the Tsar would never 
let it come to a war with Japan .... The anxiety 
which Japan, America, and, in particular, England, had 
caused the Tsar, would lead him to a rapErochernent with 
these powers and probably also to a tightening of the 
knot of alliance with France.28 
The corning of the Russo-Japanese ·War in February, 1904, was an event 
which the Kaiser, Billow, and Holstein could contemplate with a degree 
of equanimity. An ul tirnate Russian .victory .was .. a. foregone conclusion, 
but it would take time before the Russian behemoth could be roused for 
a total effort in East Asia. In the meantime, Russia's security in 
Europe would be virtually a German hostage.- Though Germany's policy-
makers differed among themselves as to which course should be followed, 
28Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow (2 vols., 
Boston, 1931), Vol. II; p. 71. 
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all three agreed that the long-awaited crossroads had been reached. 
By the spring of 1904, however, the initiative in directing 
Germanyts foreign policy had passed to the Kaiser. Billow claims that 
by that time he had become convinced that a Russian alliance should be 
pursued, although he visualized himself rather than the Kaiser as the 
primary vehicle for its realization. 29 He had convinced himself"by a 
careful study of the international, political,. and .commercial situation, 
that [Germany] must come to an understanding with-Russia. If this were -
accomplished, Roumania, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and the other 
countries would follow. 1130 This sounds striking.ly like William"s .con .... 
tinental league, but Billow would achieve it by other means. "It would 
be more practical to shut up two real statesmen-'together, . Herr 
Witte, and the German Chancellor,so that they might as quickly as 
possible reach an understanding.satisfactory to both parties. 1131 It is 
clear that Bulow had more than mere tariff treaties in mind. 
William and Bfilow apparently now shared the vision of a Russo-
German alliance and the hope of a subsequent continental bloc, but 
Holstein still nourished his doubts about the wisdom of the enterprise. 
In a memorandum he asked: 
29The·German Diplomatic Documents, however, tend to modify the 
impression of complete conversion which Bulow attempts to convey in 
his memoirs. During Apri 1 he was working with Richthofen, the foreign 
secretary on a.plan to expand the Anglo:German talks .for an arbitra-
tion treaty into a naval treaty and possibly even into a defensive alli-
ance. He specifically cautioned Richthofen to keep the matter secret 
from the Kaiser. Billow to Richthofen, April 19, 1904, E.T.S. Dugdale, 
ed., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914 (4 Vols., New York, 1930) 
Vol. III, no. 124, p. 192 ~ (Hereafter cited as GDD.) 
30Billow, Memoirs, p. 47. 
31Ibid., p. 48. 
And what could possibly cause Germany to stand by 
Russia and endanger herself? • . • .. But if Germany were 
to take sides, her world trade would be endangered. If 
one tickles the tiger, one must expect him to use his 
claws. Time will probably show whether and to what de§2ee 
there is a causal connection between the Her.ero revolt 
and the 'key to the Baltic.,33 If he wer.e to use his 
claws again he might do so more violently, perhaps too 
violently. Are we in f~~t capable of taking on the Eng-
lish and the Americans? · 
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But Holstein's negative approach,no longer.satisf:i,ed either William or 
BU low. The conclusion of the En tent~ Cordiale .appears .. to have been the. 
. . . 
event which convinced t}:l.e Kaiser that he must ~alvage the situation 
through forceful and personal action.3-5 
William had been carry:i,.ng on a surreptitious correspondence with 
the Tsar for several months in an'attempt to incite him to more force-
ful action against the Japanese. 36 Before he moved further in this 
32Early in January, 1904, a revolt of.the native Hereros had 
broken out in Southwest Africa which many Germans believed to have been 
instigated by the British. 
33Here he refers to Danish neutrality, which, it was assumed, 
Britain would violate·if she wished to strike at the German or Russian 
fleets. 
34Memorandum, February 22~ 1904, ~' Vol. 'IV, no. 823, p. 283. 
35rhe Entente appears . to have COl!le ·as·. somewhat• of a surprise to 
William even though German diplomats had been reporting regularly on 
its negotiation. It would appear that he simply did not believe that 
England and France could, in the final analysis, adjust their differ-
ences. On a statement that England would trade.Morocco for Egypt he 
placed a marginal"?", presumably indicating disbelief. Prince von 
Radolin to Bulow., March 23, 1904; GDD,. Vol. III; no. 4, p. 190. 
36His personal cor,respondence with ~he Tsar actually dates back 
into the 1890's; but.it was only in .late 1903 that the Kaiser began to 
bombard Nicholas with messages designed to.promote a Russo-Japanese war 
and alienate him from the French and English. In letters in December 
1903, and January 1904, for example, he.hinted· at Japanese arming of 
Chinese forces, British opposition to Russian .expansion in East Asia, 
and Japanese mobilization for war.being aided by.the."gift" of two 
cruisers from Britain. See Isaac·Don Levine, Letters from the Kaiser 
to the Czar (New York, 1~20), nos. XXIX-XXXI, pp~ 95-1~ At the time 
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direction, however, he paused to attempt to restore Germanyts self-
confidence in a.series of:boisterous speeches. The Kaiser.publicly 
launched his personal diplomatic initiative.at Karlsruhe on April 28. 
The tone of his speech left no doubt that something was.in the offing. 
I.hope th~t peace will not be .disturbed and.that-the 
events which we see taking place before our .eyes tend to 
fix feelings in one direction, to clear the .eye, to steel 
the courage, and to make us united, if it should be neces-
sary for us to interfere in the P2~icy of.the world, so 
that peace will not be disturbed. . 
This was much more than a personal tirade, for the Entente Cordiale was 
a blow to Germany•s diplomatic prestige which demanded a centre-balance. 
William obviously intended to provide it. At Mainz he dedicated a 
bridge on May 1, and he spoke again. 
I wish from my heart that peace, which is necessary 
for the further development of industry and trade, may be 
maintained in the future. But I am convinced that this 
bridge will prove completely adequate; if it has to be 
used for more serious transport purposes.38 
His tone became evep more truculent at Saarbrilcken on May 14. He ex-
pressed his "rockfast conviction that we have a clear conscience, and do 
not look for trouble anywhere, God knows, and He .will stand by us if 
ever our peacefulness is attacked by hostile power. t,39 By these petu-
lant demonstrations, William sought to rebuild German morale and to 
restore confidence after the announcement of the Anglo-French agreement, 
Billow objected to the"Willy-Nicky11 correspondence, .. but the Kaiser very 
bluntly informed him that it was private correspondence, and the Chan-
cellor would kindly t1mind his own business~" Anderson, First Moroccan 
Crisis, p. 138. 
37Quoted in S. B. Fay, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the 
Tsar, 1904-1905,'' American Historical Review, Vol. XXIV (October 1, 
1918), p. 53. 
38Ibid. 
39Ibid., p. 54. 
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but he chose to pursue his primary objective by more furtive means. 
Through his letters to the Tsar, the Kaiser had been busily 
planting seeds of doubt about the intentions of France,40 and the per-
fidy of Britain,41 while assuring him of Germany's pro-Russian senti-
ments. William, the stronger personality of the two, obviously exer-
cised a considerable amount of influence over the weak and irresolute 
Nicholas, and the Kaiser attempted to exploit this advantage to the 
fullest between the summers of 1904 and 1905. His duplicity borders on 
the incredulous in this undertaking. An excellent example of this was 
his reception of Edward VII, his uncle, at the Kiel regatta in June, 
1904. On the twenty-fifth he made Edward an honorary admiral of the 
German fleet, the purpose of which he portrayed as purely pacific. The 
navy, he said, would complement the German army which had maintained 
European peace for thirty years. Following these subdued words, which 
contrasted so starkly with the language he had used in the previous two 
months, he congratulated Edward upon his efforts for peace: 
Everyone knows, too, Your Majesty's words and work 
that your Majestyts whole effort is also directed toward 
this goal--toward the maintenance of peace. As I have 
steadily set my whole strength ta2reach this goal, may 
God give success to our efforts. 
Four days after this public display of amicability between the British 
and German sovereigns, William telegraphed Nicholas a report on the 
40rn the letters of February 11, William sent Nicholas documents 
which confirmed the sale of arms to China by Japan (of which he had 
earlier reported rumors) and pointed out that the raw steel for these 
arms was produced by France and shipped to Japan for finishing. See 
Levine, Letters from Kaiser, no. XXXII, pp. 105-107. 
41He informed Nicholas on June 6 that the Entente Cordiale was 
designed to prevent France from aiding Russia. The spirit of this 
letter is primarily anti-British. Ibid., no. XXXIV, pp. 112-115. 
42quoted in Fay, "Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 54. 
proceedings at Kiel. 
Uncle Albert's visit going, of course, well • 
His wish for peace is quite pronounced,- and is the motive 
for his liking to offer his services where-ever he sees 
collisions in the world. Best love to Alice. Sympathise 
sincerely with your fresh losses of ships and men. 
Willy,- A~ of A.43 
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This apparently innocuous telegram was William '-s cunning way of 
taking a backhanded slap at his uncle and planting a bit of suspicion 
in the Tsar's mind at the same time. It must be remembered that ah 
though the Russians were being consistently defeated in the combat 
which was raging over the Yalu Valley during the summer, they remained 
supremely confident that they would crush the Japanese as soon as the 
mobilization program could be gotten into full swing. It was axiomatic 
that Russia could never react to a stimulus in less than six months. 
This was, in fact, the opinion held in common throughout Europe. If 
this is understood, it is evident why anyone who urged the Russians to 
conclude peace in the summer of 1904 would immediately arouse the sus-
picion of St. Petersburg that he was either a simple-minded fool or 
harboring pro-Japanese sentiments. Since not even Nicholas was naive 
enough ·~o impute stupidity to Edward, William's little inuendo led to 
the latter conclusion. The Russians had long been convinced that if 
the British were not guilty of actively encouraging the growth of a 
bellicose spirit in Japan, they at least did nothing whatsoever to 
prevent.it. 44 
43Ibid., p. SS. 
44Holstein had noted this attitude_ in January. Holstein to Hugo 
von Radolin, January 27, 1904, HP, Vol. IV, no. 820, pp. 278-279. Even 
before then William had been working on Nicholas. On_December 1, 1903, 
he wrote to Nicholas that"· .• the Crimean combination is warming to 
its work. Your ally is making rather free with his flirt [with Great 
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The Kaiser, of course, urged no such precipitate peace upon the 
Tsar. His actions conveyed nothing but the best wishes for Russian 
successes against the Japanese. On July 10, he went so far as to send 
an open telegram to the Russian commander of the Viborg Infantry Regi-
ment congratulating him upon the prospect of soon meeting the enemy.45 
This could hardly have been calculated to increase European confidence 
in Germanyts declaration of strict neutrality and the veracity of her 
government. Throughout the summer of 1904, however, William was not 
closely supervised by his chancellor or by the foreign office, i.e., 
Holstein. Billow and Holstein, as a matter of fact, were fully engaged 
in a running argument ostensibly over the conduct of Richthofen.46 but 
in fact emanating from Billow's support of the Kaiser's inclinations 
toward the Russian alliance project. Holstein's innate hostilities 
toward anyone who crossed him were multiplied by his ill health, which 
necessitated his hospitalization in late June for an operation. The 
altercation culminated in Holstein's resignation on July 1, 47 but Billow 
refused to act upon it until the matter was finally smoothed over in the 
fall. It was not until late October, however, that Holstein returned to 
his duties, and by that date the Kaiser 1·s alliance scheme was moving 
"th th . t f . · 1 1· · 48 w1 e assis ance o grave 1nternat1ona comp 1cat1ons. It is 
Britain]. You should pull him up a little." Quoted in Anderson, First 
Moroccan Crisis, p. 138. 
45William was honorary colonel of this regiment. Fay, "Kaiser 
and Tsar, 1904-1905,'' p. 56. 
46see HP, Vol. IV, nos. 828-861, pp. 289-311. 
correspondenc~it becomes evident that Richthofen is 
for Holstein's pique at the Kaiser and Billow. 
47Ibid., no. 830, p. 292. 
In reading this 
merely an excuse 
48The complications were the Dogger Bank incident, which created 
an Anglo-Russian war scare, and the coaling of the Russian fleet by 
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doubtful whether Holstein could have blocked the course of events that 
led to the proposition of the alliance to the Tsar, 49 but his continued 
pessimism in the late fall indicates that .he might have attempted to 
block the project had he been able to do so. 
The crisis which followed the Dagger Bank incident. provided the 
Kaiser with the opportunity to approach the Tsar openly for an alliance. 
With British public opinion in such an excited state, William could 
legitimately argue that he feared the possibility of a British attack 
should German colliers continue to service the Russian Baltic Fleet. 
He therefore telegraphed Nicholas on October 27: 
It is not impossible that the Japanese and British 
governments may lodge a joint protest against our coaling 
your ships, coupled with a summation [sic] to stop further 
work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would 
be the absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to 
proceed to its destination for want of fuel. This new 
danger would have to be faced in community by Russia and 
Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally, 
France, of obligations she has taken over in the treaty of 
dual alliance with you, the "casus foederis". It is out 
of the question that France, on such an invitation, would 
try to shirk her implicit duty t0;..ward her ally. Though 
Delcasse is an anglophile "enrage", he will be wise 
enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly 
unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combination 
of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be 
formed, to attack whom the Anglo-Japanese group would 
think twice before acting .... The naval battles 
fought by Togo are fought with Cardiff coals. I am 
sorry for the mishap in the North Sea.SO 
Once again, William had correctly judged the Tsar's state of 
mind. Nicholas replied on the 29th: 
German colliers, which created fears of an Anglo-German war with Japan 
assisting Britain. 
49The Kaiser's overtures, the contract for the German colliers, 
Billow's support for the Kaiser, etc. 
SOQuoted by Fay, in "Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 60. 
I agree fully with your complaints about England's 
behavior concerning the coaling of our ships by German 
steamers, whereas she understands the rules of keeping 
neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time 
to put a stop to this. The only way, as .you say, would 
be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite 
upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance 
and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the 
outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as 
accepted by us France is bound .to join her ally. This 
combination has often come to my mind; it will mean peace 
and rest for the world.51 
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The Kaiser and Billow lost no time in replying to Nicholas' tele-
gram. In a lengthy letter William expressed his gratitude to Nicholas 
for the opportunity "to be of some use to you in a serious moment." 
Without the knowledge of any other governmental officials, he and Bulow 
had drawn up the articles of the treaty and were forwarding it forth-
with.52 The proposed alliance would, of course, '~e purely defensive, 
exclusively directed against European agressor or agressors, [sic] in 
the form of a mutual fire insurance company against incendiarism. 11 Then, 
to, secure a most willing ear for his proposals, the Kaiser tossed in a 
few remarks about the British and the French. 
51 Ibid .. 
52The following is a translation of the Kaiser's original French 
text of the treaty: 
Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and the Emperor 
of Germany, in order to localize as much as possible the Russo-Japanese 
War, have agreed to the following Articles of a treaty of defensive 
alliance. 
Article I: In case one of the two Empires should be attacked by 
a European Power, its ally will aid it with all its land and sea forces. 
The two Allies, in case of need, will also make common cause in order 
to remind France of the obligations she has assumed by the terms of the 
Franco-Russian treaty of alliance, 
Article II: The high contracting parties undertake not to con-
clude any separate peace with any common adversary. 
Article III: The undertaking to help one another also extends 
to the case where acts committed by one of the two high contracting 
parties during the war, such as the delivery of coal to a belligerant, 
should give rise after the war to complaints by a third Power as to 
pretended violations of the rights of neutrals. Levine, Letters from 
Kaiser, no. XXXVIII, pp. 128-130. 
... As for France, we both know, that the Radicals and 
anti-christian [sic] parties, which for the moment are the 
stronger ones, incline towards England, old Crimean tradi-
tions, but are opposed to war .... I positively know 
that as far back as December last the French Minister of 
Finance Rouvier from his own accord told the Financial 
Agent of another Power, that on no account whatever would 
France join you in a Russo-Japanese war, even if England 
should take sides with Japan. . . . This µnfi.ear<,i of- state 
of things will change for the better as soon-as France 
finds herself face to face with the necessity of choosing 
sides and openly declaring herself for Petersburg or 
London .... Thus it evidently lies in the interest of 
both parties to bring pressure to bear on and warn England 
to keep the Peace. If you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, 
the main result will be that France must openly and form-
ally join us both ... I herewith enclose the draft of 
the Articles of the5!reaty as you wished, may it meet with 
your approval •.. 
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William thus sent his treaty off to Nicholas well fortified with insin-
uations against the bloody British and the fickle French. He received 
no immediate acknowledgment and acceptance of the alliance, however. 
Quite the contrary, the Tsar made no commitments during the next three 
weeks despite William's prodding insistence that the alliance was the 
. 
only way for Germany and Russia to achieve security against their pre-
sent dangers. When he could no longer quibble over the wording of the 
articles, Nicholas revealed the true reason for his procrastination. 
On November 23, he wrote the Kaiser that he thought it advisable to let 
the French see the last draft of the treaty before it was signed. He 
feared that "if already approved by us both it will seem as if we tried 
to enforce the treaty on France." Under such circumstances, he thought, 
failure might easily result. He therefore requested William's "agree-
ment to acquaint the government of France with this project. 1154 
53Ibid., no. XXXVII, pp. 123-126. 
54Quoted in Fay, 11 Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 61. 
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The Kaiser was crestfallen. He knew very well that the communi-
cation of the draft to the French would mean its instantaneous death 
at the hands of that Germanophobe, Delcasse. Not one to give up without 
a fight, William tried to discourage the Tsar from taking this course . 
. . Should, however, France know that a Russian-German 
treaty is only projected, but still unsigned, she will 
immediately give short notice to her friend (if not secret 
ally) England, with whom she is bound by "entente cordiale" 
and inform her immediately. The outcome of such informa-
tion would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by the two 
allied Powers, England and Japan, on Germany in Europe. as 
well as in Asia. Their enormous maritime superiority would 
soon make short work of my small fleet and Germany would be 
temporarily crippled.SS 
Having thus vividly described the consequences of his proposed indiscre-
tion to the Tsar, the Kaiser concluded on a rather pessimistic note. 
Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you 
to conclude a treaty with me without the previous consent 
of France, then it would be a far safer ai;grnative to 
abstain from concluding any treaty at all. 
The Tsar continued to delay, however, neither accepting nor re-
jecting totally the Kaiser's proposals until William finally demanded 
that he at least guarantee Russian support of Germany in a war arising 
out of the coaling of the Baltic Fleet or face the discontinuance of 
that operation by German colliers. This was all the Tsar needed. The 
Kaiser's letter bearing the ultimatum was dated December 7; 57 on Decem-
ber 12, Count Lamsdorff handed the German ambassador to St. Petersburg 
the written assurances which William had demanded. It guaranteed 
nothing, however, other than Russia's firm resolve "fully to stand by 
the Imperial German Government in the question of the deliveries of 
ssibid. 
56Ibid., p. 62. 
57Levine, Letters from Kaiser, no. XLI, pp. 141-142. 
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coal. .. .,58 There was no resurrection of the Bismarckian reinsur-
ance treaty, no quintuple alliance, not even a small crack in the Dual 
Alliance. 
On December 28, 1904, William wrote Bulow that the Tsar had 
given him "a decided refusal to enter into .any agreement .. without the 
knowledge of Gaul. n It was t1the first failure" which he had personally 
experienced since ascending the throne. 59 He knew where the problem 
lay, however, and he described it very welL Count Lamsdorff.and M. 
Witte had "spat in the German soup. 1160 The work of Lamsdorff was, 
indeed, clearly manifested in the Tsar's rejection of the treaty. Left 
to his own devices, Nicholas would no doubt have signed the first draft 
of the treaty without.hesitation, but Lamsdorff did not relish the 
prospect of feeling "the. heavy ·weight.·. . . of .the iron bands" of a 
G 11 . 61 erman a 1ance. The Tsar had received .William •.s proposals in the 
Dagger Bank incident; Lamsdorff was not convinced that the British would 
attack Russia, and was therefore much .more hesitant to accept the 
Germans upon their own terms. Thus, he counseled the Tsar to delay, and 
he assisted him in amending the draft to a form.which would .be benefi-
cial to Russia and, as he probably hoped, unacceptable to William and 
Billow. 62 
58Quoted in Fay, "Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 63. 
59Bttlow, Memoirs, pp. 77-78. 
60william II to Billow, November 23, 1904. Quoted in Anderson, 
First Moroccan Crisis, p. 171. 
61Ibid., p. 168. 
62Ibid., PP· 168-169. 
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Oddly enough, it may be said that it was the Kaiser himself who 
killed the alliance project, for it was he who forwarded the ultimatum 
to Nicholas that the coaling operations be guaranteed against a British 
or Japanese attack. This left no further room for negotiations on the 
matter, and served to provide Germany with a localized and specific 
agreement. The indications are that the Kaiser contracted a bad case 
of "nerves" over the possibility of a British attack upon the German 
navy. A letter which Billow wrote to Holstein on December 15, points to 
the repeated warnings which the military and naval attaches in London 
were sending regarding the inevitability of such an attack. 63 Undoubt-
edly the Kaiser was also aware of these reports, and given his excitable 
nature, one may conclude that they had considerably shaken his confidence 
The attention of the German diplomats was temporarily turned 
away from the East during the opening months of 1905. With Holstein's 
return to active duty, he succeeded in reviving once.again his policy of 
negating the importance of the Entente Cordiale by humiliating France 
and thus demonstrating to Britain the essential worthlessness .of any 
agreement concluded without consideration for Germany's interests.64 
This demonstration, of course, took the form of the confrontation with 
France over Morocco. The Kaiser lent himself to this endeavor by dis-
embarking at Tangier, exposing himself to no small personal danger in 
the process, and thus indicating that Germany would block any attempt 
63Bernhard von Billow to Holstein, December 14, 1904, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 869, p. 317. 
64Emil Ludwig, in his biography of William II, incorrectly 
asserts that Holstein supported the Russian Alliance project in 1904-05. 
He did not; he tolerated it until such time as he was able to place the 
emphasis back upon his anti-French policies. See Ludwig, Wilhelm Hohen-
zollern, The Last of the Kaisers, (trans. by Ethel Colburn Mayne, New 
York, 19275'":- PP:-256-257. 
by France to establis~ a protectorate over Morocco. Germany would in-
sist upon the principle of the "Open Door" in Morocco, and to that end 
the German government called for an international conference to settle 
the Moroccan question. 65 By June, however, Holstein was becoming dis-
illusioned with the Morocco scheme, and while maintaining that Germany 
wanted nothing more than out of the mess, placed the blame for the 
entire matter upon Delcasse. 66 He felt that the Kaiser, too, came in 
for his share of condemnation in the matter because of his repeated 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy. Holstein's extremely 
bad temper at this time is indicated by a rather short-fused letter 
which he penned to Billow declaring his willingness to confpont the 
Kaiser personally rather than to continue to suffer "a situation which 
I regard as undignified. 1167 
William had all the while kept the door open for the return of 
his pet project, a Russo-German alliance. Once more, the course of 
events in East Asia was favoring him by making Nicholas quite willing 
to listen to anyone who could promise him release from his predicament. 
The New Year had been celebrated to the news of the .fall .. of Port Arthur, 
and with the loss of this fortress, further reverses could be expected 
in Manchuria. In February Russia had been wracked by internal disturb-
ances, and revolution appeared possible at any moment. March brought 
65For an explanation of Holstein's reasoning on the Morocco 
Crisis and the call for a conference see Holstein to Bernhard von Billow, 
April 5, 1905, HP, Vol. IV, no. 882, pp. 328-329. 
66Holstein to Hugo von Radolin, June 14, 1905, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 891, pp. 342-343. 
67Holstein to Bernhard von Billow, June 17, 1905, HP, Vol. IV, 
no. 892, p. 344. 
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the battle for Mukden and.another defeat for Russian arms, but the 
greatest blow was yet to fall. It must have seemed to the Russians 
that Pandora had broken off the lid of her box entirely, for on May 27, 
the Baltic Fleet met its destiny at Tsushima. 
Through all of these misfortunes, William had kept his .letters 
flowing to Nicholas, despite a warning about how they were read.in Paris 
the day after they arrived in St. Petersburg. 68 On February 21, he had 
written the Tsar a long letter advising him on how best to deaLwith the 
revolutionary unrest then sweeping Russia. Of course he did .not fail 
to note that of the unpleasant facts which he .felt obliged .to relate to 
"Nicky," the ones t•forming the base mostly are supplied by France, 
who as 'amie et Alliee;' is allways .[sic] best informed .. about Russia.II 
He proceeded to encourage the Tsar to concede as little to popular 
democracy as possible, take the Cross, go to Moscow.and preach a holy 
war against the Japanese. By thus placing himself at the head of his 
people he would regain their confidence and unite the empire against a 
common foe. 69 
In his letter of June 3, however, William painted a gloomy pie~ 
ture to Nicholas and advised him to end the .war .. as soon.as.honorably 
possible. The Kaiser wrote in his Teutonized English: 
• How I have been feeling for and thinking of you all 
these last months I need not say! Also of every phase of 
Admiral Roshestwensky's [sic] progresst The great stake 
which he represented in your hand has been played and .hon,. 
ourably lossed [sic]. He did everything in his powers to 
come up to your wishes, but Providence willed it otherwise 
68wi1 liam I s marginal comment on the report was: "A lie, like 
the rest." Metternich to Billow, December 25, 1904, GDD, Vol. III, 
no. 367, p. 212. ~-
69Levine, Letters from Kaiser, no. XLVI, pp. 156-169. 
and he met defeat bravely serving his master to the last! 
My fullest sympathy is with him and you. 
From the purely military strategical point of view 
the defeat in the straits of Corea ends the chances for 
a decided turn of the scales in your favor; ... Now 
as I wrote you in my last letter--Febr. 6th .. .,.-the war 
is very unpopular .•.. Is tt compatible with the 
responsibility of a Ruler to continue to force a whole 
nation against its declared will to send its sons to be 
killed by hecatombs only for his sake? 
It must be looked upon as Gods [sic] will that.things 
have taken this course! God has imposed this burthen [sic] 
on you, and it must be bourne, but perhaps by His inten-
tions and with His hel~0 lasting good may come out of all 
this in the end .... 
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If the Tsarts view coincided with his, William remarked in closing, he 
should remember in what high esteem the Japanese held the Americans. 
11 If anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to induce 
them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Rooseveldt 
[sic]." Of course, if the Tsar wished, the Kaiser ttcould easily place 
myself--privately--en rapport with him, as we are very intimate; 11 71 
It is probabl:e that at the time he wrote these.words William was 
already planning his second attempt at concluding a Russo~German alli-
ance. Billow notes that William told him in June.that he did not plan to 
visit the Norwegian fjords on his usual summer cruise, ostensibly be-
cause of the dispute then occurring between Norway and Sweden, but would 
remain in the Bal tic Sea. The chancellor "soon saw that the Kaiser 
wished to meet the Tsar in the Baltic," and William had several conver-
sations with Bulow on the advisability of such a meeting. 72 Billow was 
70Ibid., no. XLVII, pp. 171-176. 
71 Ibid. 
72Billow, Memoirs, p. 151. 
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favorably inclined toward the idea, but he also thought it possible 
that Nicholas might not react favorably in view of the repeated disas-
ters which Russia had suffered in the war. If the meeting were 
arranged, however, he thought Lamsdorff should be present so he could 
be forced to express his views openly, "instead of playing the part of 
Penelope, who worked by day and unravelled her thread by night, after 
73 the return of the Tsar to St. Petersburg." Btllow cautioned William 
that a treaty signed only by Nicholas was unlikely to be of much 
value. 74 
Before the Kaiser boarded his yacht at Swinemunde on July 10, 
Billow once more cautioned him "to make no unconsidered agreement about 
Denmark and the Baltic, as •.. this might lead to an English 
attack. [I]t would be advisable to get from the Tsar only the 
promise that he would recommend to Lambsdorff the conclusion of a 
German-Russian peace and defensive treaty .. " William "should leave 
everything concerning the working out of this to Lambsdorff and [Bil-
low] }175 Billow's closing observation was prescient indeed, if we do not 
credit it to hindsight. t 1A slight shadow crossed the _alert, volatile 
countenance of His Majesty and showed me that the exalted gentleman was 
this time particularly confident of achieving everything through the 
compelling power of his own personality." 76 
The Kaiser undertook his cruise with the intention of doing- .. 
exactly what the chancellor had suspected. After visiting with.the 
73Ioid. 
74BUlow's consistent ability to predict the result of the Kaiser's 
projects is nothing short of amazing. 
75B"l M ' 152 u ow, emoirs, p. . 
76 Ibid. 
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King and Crown Prince of Sweden on July 13, William started a leisurely 
return voyage. Then on July 19, from a port north of Stockholm, the 
Kaiser cast his bread upon the waters. He telegraphed Nicholas: 
I shall shortly be on my return journey and cannot 
pass across entrance of the Finnish Sea without sending 
you best love and wishes. Should it give you any pleas-
ure to see me--either on shore or on your yacht--of course 
am always at your disposai.77 
The Kaiser's bread returned even more quickly than the preacher in 
Ecclesiastes had anticipated, for the Tsar replied immediately: 
Delighted with your proposal. Would it suit you to 
meet me at Bjoerkesund, near Viborg, a pleasant, quiet 
place, living on board our yachts?78 
William's delight at his success could hardly be contained~ It is quite 
obvious in the telegram in which he replied to the Tsar: 
Nobody has the slightest idea.of meeting. The faces 
of my guests will be worth seeing when they suddenly behold 
your_yac9~· A fine lark. Tableaux. Which dress for the 
meeting? 
Surely it was quite unintentional, but the Kaiser had hit upon a 
most appropriate description of what was to follow: "A fine lark." 
Shortly before sunset on the _evening of Sunday, July 23, 1905, the imper-
ial yacht Hohenzollern steamed into Bjorko Bay and dropped anchor along-
side the imperial yacht Polar Star. As he had anticipated, William 
found Nicholas in a most despondent and pliant mood, and after two days 
of sharing fond memories, old wine, and mutual grievances against the 
British and the French, the Kaiser worked his will upon the Tsar. 
In recounting the scene as Nicholas signed the draft of the 
treaty which William "happened" to have in his pocket during the second 
77Quoted in Fay, "Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 65. 
78Ibid. 
79Ibid., p. 48. 
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day of their visit, the Kaiser remembered that he "thought of Frederick 
William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather and Nicholas I. Were they near 
at that moment? At any rate they saw it all and were overjoyed. 1180 One 
almost hopes that the Kaiser's ancestors did share his joy at this 
moment, for it was to be but momentary. In obtaining the Tsar 1.s signa-
ture on the treaty, William violated every instruction which his chan-
cellor had given him. Not only did he persist in concluding the agree-
ment without the countersignature of the Tsar's first minister, but he 
altered the text in a manner which made the alliance of much less value 
to Germany. By inserting the words"~ Europe" in the first article, 
William restructed the scope of Russia I s obligations to Europe proper. 
If the treaty had any value at all to Billow and Holstein, it was because 
it offered the prospect of applying pressure to the British through a 
Russian threat on the Indo-Persian frontiers. 81 It was only with the 
greatest reluctance, and then only because they decided that the 
Kaiser's version was better than nothing, that Bulow and Holstein agreed 
to accept the treaty. Their acquiescence made very little difference, 
however, for back in St. Petersburg "Penelope" was busily· unwinding 
threads. 
Nicholas had kept the treaty secret from his ministers.until the 
conclusion of peace with Japan in September. As this was the prerequi~ 
site which brought the treaty into force, he then felt that he was 
obliged to inform them of its existence. Lamsdorff's reaction was pre-
dictable. He wrote to a friend that 
80Quoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 284. 
81 Bulow wrote to the Kaiser that "As far as I am able to foresee, 
the Treaty in its present form with the addition of "~ Europe," will, 
if it becomes known, bring a great sense of relief in England." Bulow, 
Memoirs, p. 157. 
. . . the Emperor William was able with the aid of base 
flattery to convince our dear Emperor that he alone was 
his true friend and his support, and that the only salva-
tion for Russia and Europe lay in a new Triple Alliance 
which in his opinion France would gladly join.82 
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Lamsdorff had no illusions about the consequences of the Tsar's act, for 
he knew full well the value of the French alliance. 
From long experience I have become convinced that 
the alliance with France is necessary in .order to have 
really good relations with Germany. Otherwise we lose 
our independence; for I know nothing heavier than the 
German yoke. Without sacrificing the most intimate 
relations with Berlin, we have very tactfully repulsed 
all attempts to compromise us.83 
After much argumentation, Lamsdorff, with the assistance of 
Count Witte and the Grand Duke Nicholas, convinced the Tsar that the 
treaty was inconsistent with the terms of the Dual Alliance. It was 
decided that before the Bjorko treaty could become operative either 
Germany must be persuaded to make it compatible with the terms of the 
Dual Alliance, or France must be persuaded to reinterpret the terms of 
the Dual Alliance in such a manner as to make it compatible with the 
BJ·o··rko"' t 84 agreemen. Lamsdorff knew, of course, that neither the French 
nor the Germans would be willing to surrender the point. In that.case, 
the Tsar had already agreed that the Treaty of Bjorko would remain a 
dead letter. 
The Kaiser, however, refused to accept this interpretation of 
the situation. He saw no such conflict between the Treaty of Bjorko 
and the Dual Alliance. In fact, he became quite blunt with his repen-
tant cousin. "We joined hands before God, who heard our vows. I 
82Quoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, p. 284. 
83 Ibid., p. 297. 
84 Ibid., p. 301. 
therefore think that the treaty can well come into existance. 
What is signed is signed, and God is our testator."85 
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William's protests notwithstanding, the Tsar wrote to him on 
November 23 that to fulfill the requirements of both the Dual Alliance 
and the Treaty of Bjorko it would be necessary to add the following 
declaration to the latter: 
In view of the difficulties in the way of an immed-
iate adhesion by the French Government to the treaty of 
defensive alliance signed at Bjorkoe •... it is under-
stood that Article I of that act shall not have any appli-
cation in the eventuality of a war with France and that 
the mutual engagements which unite the latter to Russia 
will be maintained in full until the establishment of an 
accord a trois. 
The Kaiser replied to Nicholas again on November 28, stating that the 
Germans considered the treaty binding despite the Tsar's protests. 
Nicholas replied on December 2 that without the.proposed additional de-
claration, the treaty was unacceptable. William II had suffered the 
second personal failure of his reign. 
In a letter to Nicholas on July 27, William had written: "The 
24th of July 1905 is a cornerstone in European politics and turns over 
a new leaf in the history of the world .... n 87 He was correct, but 
not in the sense in which he had meant the statement. The failure of 
the attempt to secure a Russo-German alliance and the equally unsuccess-
ful attempt to disrupt the solidarity of the Entente Cordiale meant 
diplomatic isolation for Germany. Even Holstein recognized the totality 
of this failure. A few months later he would write to a friend: 
85 Quoted in Fay, "Kaiser and Tsar, 1904-1905," p. 71. 
86quoted in Anderson, First Moroccan Crisis, pp. 303-304. 
87Levine, Letters from Kaiser, no. XLVIII, p. 179. 
104 
Of course we are isolated, and we will remain isolated 
as long as France and England co-operate. . In short, 
in the present international atmosphere it seems to me that 
the correct and dignified thing to do would be to act like 
Russia after the Crimean War (la Russie se recueille) 
and calmly to withdraw into ourselves .. ~ .. 88 
For once he was, perhaps, correct. 
During the eighteen months which passed between the outbreak of 
the Russo-Japanese War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Bjorko, Ger-
many's international position slipped drastically, and, as the next 
nine years would prove, the consequences were to be catastrophic. The 
disorderly, almost frantic conduct of Germany's foreign policy during 
the Russo-Japanese War was but a sampling of the chaos which would 
infect the Auswartiges Amt in 1914. Such inconsistency in a nation as 
powerful as the Germany of 1905 could not but .create a disturbed atti-
tude among her neighbors. Furthermore~ as the number and scale of 
Japanese successes continued to multiply throughout .1904 .. 05, it appeared 
likely that the East Asian war might become a world war. These fears 
moved Britain and France to adjust their differences in .1904, and when 
the Germans failed to disrupt this entente, the way was cleared for the 
conclusion of that alliance which William, Billow, and Holstein had 
feared most. Although the Triple Entente was not effected until 1907, 
it owed much to the drama enacted at Bjorko in 1905. 




Diplomatic historians have called the first decade .. of the twent-
ieth century the t'Diplomatic Revolution of the Twentieth Century, t-t It 
is a very apt description. European diplomacy after 1898 was in a state 
of turmoil which even contemporaries recognized as being rather unusual. 
The race for concessions in China and imperial competition in other 
parts of the world added emphasis to the tension which appeared to be 
building among the European powers. The relatively stable balance 
which the Bismarckian system had imposed had begun to crumble almost 
as soon as its architect had departed. 
The failure of Germany to renew the Reinsurance Treaty-with 
Russia now appears to have been the catalyst which started the.European 
pot boiling. France exploited the situation and .emerged with the Dual 
Alliance, which proved to be the cornerstone of a new diplomatic edi~ 
fice. But it was not until 1898 that events began to move with purpose 
and a considerable velocity. That year Theophile Delcasse became the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs for France, Britain and France faced each 
other at Fashoda, and the "partition" of China began in earnest. 
The advent of the Delcasse Foreign Ministry heralded a period of 
international disturbance within itself. France now had a man after 
the cut of Gambetta, who knew what he wanted and had the intelligence 
and the patience to get it. Delcasse was determined that France should 
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be freed from the diplomatlc isolation to which the Bismarckian system 
had confined her. The Russian Alliance was basic to this, and he was 
careful to maintain the lines of communication with .St .. Petersburg, but 
the prize which he sought most was an Anglo-French entente. Fashoda was 
ample testimony to Delcasse's determination to adjust Anglo-French 
differences. Wars have been fought between Britain and France over 
circumstances which were by far less crucial. But even his concessions 
to~Britain at Fashoda and a persistant courting of British opinion were 
not enough to secure the desired change of attitude at .London. 
The greatly increased scale of foreign intrusion into China 
reaped its bitter harvest in the summer of 1900. The Boxer .Rebellion, 
in one respect, marks a point of demarcation in the process of change 
which European diplomatic relationships were undergoing. It clearly 
demonstrated the modernity and the efficiency of Japan's military and 
naval forces, a fact which had been successfully concealed during the 
greater part of its accomplishment. The British, in particular, were 
impressed by the Japanese performance. In very difficult circumstances 
because of the Boer War, the British were only too happy.to have the 
Japanese pull their Asian chestnuts from the fire. The.Japanese thus 
introduced Europeans to something new and unique--a first rate Asian 
military power. 
The British were the first to recognize. the .value .. of .Japan as 
an Asian power in readjusting European relationships to their advantage. 
They concluded their alliance with Japan in 1902-primarily as a counter 
in East Asia to Russian threats to British interests in Central Asia, 
but the importance and the consequences of their act proved to be much 
more far-reaching than that. Intended as a means of decreasing the 
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rapidly growing tensions between Russia and Japan in Korea and Manchuria, 
the alliance was an immediate success. Russia, in the ensuing twelve to 
fifteen months, was considerably chastened by the spectre of the Japan-
ese army and the British navy working together. This was only a temper-
ary check, however, and by mid.,1903 the two antagonists appeared headed 
for an imminent conflict. 
To the British the prospect of becoming involved in a war with 
France as a result of the trouble between their respective allies, 
Japan and Russia, was reason enough for an honest attempt to reach an 
Anglo-French understanding. The centrality of Japan's changed status 
in the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale appears conclusive. The 
British had resisted such an adjustment for six years because they knew 
the price for such an understanding would not be cheap. Only under the 
threat of an unjustifiable catastrophy--an Anglo-French war in which no 
vital interest was at stake--did they meet the French .halfway and con-
clude an accord. The threat of a Russo-Japanese war encouraged the 
inception of Anglo-French negotiations, and the actual outbreak of the 
war hastened the conclusion of the Entente, but the real .proof of the 
understanding was its ability to withstand the intense pressure which 
Germany applied in 1905-1906. Oddly enough, the circumstance which pro-
vided the impetus for the Entente--the Russo-Japanese War-,-also provided 
the opportunity for Germany to put it to its severest test. 
The war offered Germany an excellent opportunity to avert the 
encirclement which appeared to be imminent. While Russia was occupied 
with Japan, her ability to interfere in Europe and thus her value to 
France would be greatly diminished. If she could be brought to terms 
while her defenses were thus weakened, Germany's eastern frontier would 
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be secured as in the days of Bismarck, and France could be put in her 
place--the Entente Cordiale notwithstanding. It is unthinkable that 
under other than the most unusual circumstances one nation would attempt 
to force the ties of an alliance upon another. Such escapades as the 
Bjorko meeting would not have been possible in.1903 or even as late as 
mid-1904. But the frantic efforts of the Germans in their attempt to 
disrupt either the Entente or the Dual Alliance did.nothing more than 
to strengthen the bonds of both. Germany was isolated by the end of 
the war, and the groundwork was laid for the future conclusion of the 
Triple Entente. 
The totality of Russia's defeat was most important to the sue-
cess with which she and Britain adjusted.their longstanding differences 
in 1907. But it also contributed to another development which Billow 
and Holstein, in particular, had feared. Checkmated in East Asia, 
Russia once more turned her expansionist activities toward Europe. The 
post-war period saw a revival of interest in the Balkans, and the follow-
ing eight years were punctuated with numerous crises and war scares. 
The holocaust finally came, of course, in 1914. 
In one of his numerous letters of resignation, Holstein summar-
ized the situation beautifully in January, 1906 . 
. A war a_trois against Germany is therefore one of 
the possibilities of the future. 
During the next few years Russia will be.primarily 
occupied with her own affairs. If our relations to Eng-
land do not improve during this period of grace, if in 
the meantime England's connection with the Dual Alliance 
becomes even closer, then the German Reich faces a ser-
ious future. Three against one are heavy odds.1 
Holstein could not have realized the prescience of his observations. 
!Holstein to Bernhard von Billow, (Draft) January, 1906, HP 
Vol. IV, no. 919, p. 381. 
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It must be acknowledged, then, that one of the most significant 
factors which initiated the Diplomatic Revolution of the Twentieth 
Century was the return of an Asian power to the world scene. In cen~ 
turies past Asian nations had at least been as strong as those of the 
West. In the thirteenth century, Mongol invaders .came as far as the 
Adriatic, the campfires of the Turks burned around Vienna in 1683, and 
the Chinese had sent naval expeditions to the East African Coast.in the 
fifteenth century. But from the period of the Renaissance until the 
twentieth century, the European continent has held the predominant 
balance of power in the world, 
In some ways the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 may be 
viewed simply as a redress of balance in the world power structure. 
Indeed, as the twentieth century moves toward its conclusion it would 
appear that the shift, of which Port Arthur signaled the beginning, is 
far from complete. Increasingly, Hiroshima appears to have been only 
a temporary check, and as Japan's neighbor on the continent gradually 
returns to a semblance of normalcy this trend can only be accentuated. 
If this is so, then the importance of the years from 1902 to 1905 will 
be increasingly recognized. 
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